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Debunking Dilution Doctrine: Toward a
Coherent Theory of the Anti-Free-Rider
Principle in American Trademark Law
DAVID

J. FRANKLYN*

INTRODUCTIONt

This Article argues that while American dilution law purports to be
about preventing dilutive harm, it really is about preventing free-riding
on famous marks. Because of this mismatch between dilution's stated
purpose and hidden goal, it is a clumsy and largely incoherent doctrinal
device. It does not allow judges to turn the anti-free-riding impulse into a
carefully circumscribed set of principles with identifiable limits. This
Article argues that it would be better to scrap dilution altogether and
replace it with an independent cause of action that explicitly prevents
free-riding in appropriate circumstances.
On its face, dilution remains a harm-based doctrine which focuses on
whether the unauthorized use of a famous trademark causes the famous
mark to lose its selling power and commercial magnetism-i.e., its ability
to distinguish goods or services in the marketplace. The flaw in this
approach is that such harm is always speculative and exceedingly difficult
to prove. One can never really be sure, or even fairly confident, that a
famous mark is losing its selling power due to the use of the same or
similar mark by another. Indeed, plaintiffs find it quite difficult to make
this showing.'
* Professor of Law, Executive Director of the McCarthy Institute for Intellectual Property and
Technology Law, Director of the Intellectual Property LLM. Program: University of San Francisco
School of Law. J.D., i99o, University of Michigan Law School.
t I am particularly grateful for the insightful and thoughtful comments of my friend and
colleague at the University of San Francisco School of Law, Professor J. Thomas McCarthy, who is the
author of the six volume treatise, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS (rev. ed. 2003). Professor McCarthy has
written extensively about dilution law and was an invaluable resource in the preparation of this
Article. I am also grateful for the helpful comments I received from Professors Graeme Dinwoodie,
Mark Lemley, Joe Liu, Susan Freiwald, Josh Rosenberg, and Roger Schechter. Finally, I thank my
research assistant, Marco Montesano, for his help in locating and translating Italian trademark cases.
i. Proving dilution was made even more difficult by the Supreme Court's recent ruling in the
Victoria's Secret case, where the Court held that plaintiffs must prove that dilutive harm has actually
begun to occur as a result of the challenged use; it is no longer enough to show that such harm is likely
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And yet plaintiffs often win on their dilution claims. Why is this so?
This Article argues that the plaintiff success rate is due largely to the fact
that judges and juries seek to vindicate an interest that is considerably
different than the interest which dilution law purports to protect. The
hidden interest is a desire to punish free-riding. There is a basic
conviction that one should not reap where one has not sown. This is both
a moral and economic principle. It is the true driving force in many
dilution cases-and it is distinct from the stated dilution purpose of
protecting famous marks against dilutive harm. This can be seen from the
fact that plaintiffs frequently win such cases when proof of dilutive harm
is remote and highly speculative, at best, but free-riding seems obvious.
The anti-free-riding impulse can either stay hidden in American
trademark law or it can be openly considered and debated. It is difficult
to defend its continued latency. Having a hidden agenda in the law is not
a good thing. It prevents judges from identifying the actual competing
interests at stake in the cases, and it retards the ability of judges to bring
coherency to a particular area of law. It also enables judges to misuse the
concept and to apply it in cases where it ought not to apply. The result
has been that, in some instances, dilution law has offered too little
protection to famous mark owners,' while in other cases it has offered
to occur in the future. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).
[hereinafter short cited as Victoria'sSecret].
2. The argument that dilution offers too little protection to trademark owners is contrary to the
bulk of scholarly writing on the subject. Most articles on dilution law-and there are many-have
argued that it is too broad. See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, The Modem Lanham Act and the Death of
Common Sense, io8 YALE L.J. 1687, 1697-1713 (1999) (detailing and criticizing the overly broad
approach taken to dilution by U.S. courts); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Trademark Monopolies, 48 EMORY
L.J. 367, 4o8-jo (i999) (criticizing dilution doctrine as overbroad); Sara Stadler Nelson, The Wages of
Ubiquity in Trademark Law, 88 IowA L. REv. 732, 789 (2003) (arguing that current dilution law
wrongly allows owners of famous marks to extensively collaterally license their marks and thereby
self-dilute while still retaining anti-dilution protection against others); Howard J. Shire, Dilution
Versus Deception-Are State Antidilution Laws an Appropriate Alternative to the Law of
Infringement?, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 273, 296 (1987) (arguing that dilution could dangerously grant the
owner of a distinctive mark nearly limitless property interests in the mark, because, if properly
applied, dilution prevents the use of a distinct famous mark in connection with any type of goods or
services other than those of the famous mark owner). The United States Supreme Court has taken a
similar approach in its recent decision in the Victoria's Secret case. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at
432-33 (substantially narrowing the scope of federal dilution law by holding that plaintiffs must show
actual (as opposed to merely likely) dilution to prevail under the federal act). On the other hand, some
commentators have argued that dilution law does not go far enough in protecting brand equity. See,
e.g., Jerre B. Swann & Theodore H. David, Jr., Dilution, An Idea Whose Time Has Gone; Brand
Equity as Protectable Property, the New/Old Paradigm, I J. IMTLL. PROP. L 219, 255-56 (1994)
(arguing for explicit rights in brand equity going beyond anti-dilution law). The opposition to a broad
approach to dilution may be grounded, in part, in the fear that an expansive approach to language
ownership is likely to intrude too much on expressive freedom This is not an idle fear. But it is an
unfocused fear. The problem is not with expansive language ownership per se; rather, it is with
allowing people to have broad control fights in language they did not invent. Unfortunately, current
dilution law permits exactly this wrong type of expansive ownership to occur. Here, I argue for a much
broader (and more coherent) approach to trademark protection-but I would limit this broader
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too much protection. At a minimum, then, there is a need to identify the
anti-free-riding impulse in trademark law as a reality and to articulate
how it is functioning. Toward this end, this Article explores how the antifree-riding impulse has been a decisive, yet unstated, factor in many
reported dilution cases.
A more controversial issue is whether the anti-free-riding impulse
should be treated as legitimate and turned into an independent cause of
action, or whether it should be rejected as a rogue and dangerous
inclination. My position in this Article is that we ought to embrace the

impulse as a legitimate expression of judicial desire to provide expansive
property rights for certain kinds of words. It has been said that law
should follow custom, not the other way around. There undoubtedly is a
judicial custom of punishing free-riders in the trademark context. Judges
appear eager to do this even when the free-riding is likely not harming
the economic interests of the trademark owner-or, at least in cases
where proof of confusion and dilution is absent. They are likely to
continue to enforce this impulse regardless of the formal requirements of
trademark law. My thesis here is that they frequently are enforcing this
impulse for good reasons. A strong case can be made that free-riding on
a famous mark is unfair and economically undesirable. The judicial
inclination to punish free-riding deserves respect and refinement, not
dismissive condemnation.
Having said that, however, I am mindful of the reasons why many
courts and commentators may be reluctant to recommend this broad
form of trademark protection. There may be a fear that a cause of action
which prohibits free-riding without any proof of harm would be far too
broad. Such a cause of action could be difficult to control, and it might
trample on other important interests of persons and companies that are
searching for new trademarks. In short, it may be far too unwieldy an
instrument to place into the hands of judges.
These are understandable fears, but, ultimately, they prove
unfounded. For one thing, this view assumes that current dilution law
cabins the anti-free-riding impulse in a meaningful way. I attempt to
show here that this assumption is unwarranted. More fundamentally, I
try to show that it is possible to articulate meaningful limits on a freeriding cause of action without resort to dilution principles like blurring
and tarnishment.3 Requiring a finding of economic harm to the famous
protection to a narrower class of words than currently are eligible for dilution protection. If, as I show,
expansive protection is given only for coined and quasi-coined words, there will be little risk of any
significant intrusion on expressive freedom. For a fuller treatment of this topic, see infra Part IV.
3. Blurring is the typical form of dilution. It means that a famous mark's commercial magnetism
will become blurred, and therefore less capable of functioning as a strong brand identifier, if other
companies are allowed to use the same or a similar mark to sell a variety of unrelated goods. See 4 J.
THOMAS McCARniY, McCARTMY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETMON § 24:68 (rev. ed. 2003).
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mark is not the only way, or even the best way, to limit the anti-freeriding impulse.' I argue here that a more significant set of limits can be
found by focusing on the language sharing and expressive freedom
interests of persons who wish to use marks that are identical or similar to
famous marks.5 These interests need to be closely examined and carefully
articulated. One can find some effort in the decided cases to locate
precisely these kinds of limits. But the efforts have been sporadic and
vague. Part of my goal here is to bring this discussion out into the open.
Nor are we completely without guidance or precedent in this effort.
Some European countries have a cause of action, explicitly denominated
"unfair advantage," which enables judges to punish free-riding without
resort to tortured reasoning about alleged dilutive harm.6 This cause of
action, which finds no direct counterpart in American law, appears in
most instances to be limited to situations where defendants display a
certain kind of "bad faith," meaning they knowingly free-ride on another
party's well-known -mark7 . The European experience with the unfair
advantage cause of action provides a useful starting place for crafting an
independent and explicit form of protection against free-riding in
American trademark law.
But it is only a place to start our discussion. The Europeans have not
done a particularly good job of articulating why free-riding is acceptable
in some situations but not in others. The project for American trademark
scholars is to pick up where the Europeans have left off. It should be
possible to lay out a coherent theory of why free-riding is acceptable in
some cases, but undesirable in others. It should also be possible to
identify a consistent set of limiting principles which can be used in new
cases. In the end, the result of this effort should yield a body of law that
is at once more coherent and intellectually honest than current dilution
law.
The remainder of this Article is divided into seven Parts. Part I
Tarnishment is the other principal form of dilution. This refers to cases where unauthorized uses of a
famous mark tarnish its image by associating it with an unwholesome or lower quality product. See id
§ 24:69. For a more complete discussion of these concepts, see infra Part I.
4. Indeed, a strong argument exists that the harm-based focus of dilution law is a proxy for
deeper concerns which are more accurately rooted in beliefs about language sharing and expressive
freedom. These interests may be thought too indefinite, however, to serve as determinate limits. Harm
is thought more certain. However, as I show below, harm itself is a vague and malleable concept in
dilution law. It offers a false sense of security as a limiting concept. It often operates as a mask for the
true countervailing interests that need to be considered. For a more complete discussion of this topic,
see infra Part IV.
5. My claim here is that dilution law is at once too broad and too narrow. It offers too little (and
too uncertain) protection to too broad a category of words. It should offer a far simpler and more
potent form of protection to a much smaller set of words. The proposal advanced here would provide
an expansive property right for a more limited class of words. See infra Parts IV, VI.
6. See infra Part VI.
7. See infra Part VI.
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provides an historical overview of the development of dilution law in the
United States. Part II argues that the requirements of American dilution
law are inherently indeterminate, exceedingly difficult to prove, and if
applied rigorously should result in few plaintiff victories. Part III seeks to
explain the surprising plaintiff success rate in dilution cases as a function
of the anti-free-rider impulse. Part IV argues that the anti-free-rider
impulse should be embraced, not eschewed, and that it can be grounded
ina compelling "as between" type of rationale. Part V discusses how the
proposed new cause of action might be limited based on principles of
language sharing and expressive freedom. Part VI offers the European
"unfair advantage" cause of action as a starting place for crafting a new
anti-free-riding cause of action in American law and discusses how that
cause of action should be modified to take account of the language
sharing and expressive freedom considerations discussed above. Part VII
revisits the history of dilution law in the United States and argues that
the proposal advanced here captures the essence of the original dilution
proposal as articulated in the 1920s, before dilution law took a wrong
turn to focus on harm. Finally, this Article offers some concluding
observations.

I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. DILUTION LAW
Trademark law can be visualized as containing a core doctrine, often
referred to as the likelihood of confusion analysis, and a broader more
expansive doctrine, often referred to as dilution. The core doctrine,
which comprised all of trademark law until the mid-I99Os, allows
trademark owners to prevent unauthorized parties from using a
trademark that is confusingly similar to the trademark owner's mark.8
Under this doctrine, for example, Kodak could prevent a rival camera
company from selling Kodaka cameras.
To prevail on such a claim, Kodak would have to show that
consumers would be likely to believe either that Kodaka cameras were
manufactured by the original Kodak Company or, at a minimum, that
consumers were confused as to the affiliation or association between the
respective producers of products bearing the Kodak and Kodaka marks.
Trademark law does not tolerate such confusion, and it permits
trademark owners to stop it from occurring. The rationale for providing

8. For an overview of the likelihood of confusion doctrine, see McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 23:123:4. For a general history of trademark law, see Thomas D. Drescher, The Transformation and
Evolution of Trademarks-FromSignals to Symbols to Myth, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301 (1992); Daniel
M. McClure, Trademarks and Unfair Competition. A CriticalHistory of Legal Thought, 69 TRADEMARK
REP. 305 (I979); and Benjamin G. Paster, Trademarks- Their Early History, 59 TRADEMARK REP. 551
(1969). For a treatment of early trademark history, see FRANK I. SCHECHTER, THE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF THE LAw RELATING TO TRADE-MARKS (Faculty of Law of Columbia University eds.,
1925).
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this type of protection is two-fold. First, it prevents a company like
Kodaka from committing a form of commercial impersonation and
defrauding consumers as to the source of goods.9 Second, it enables the
real Kodak Company to prevent a diversion of sales to an impostor.'"
Prior to the adoption of dilution as a distinct doctrine in the United
States, trademark owners were confined to the likelihood of confusion
analysis. Under that analysis, only direct competitors could be liable for
wrongfully using the established trademark of another company." That
rationale for the competitor limitation was simple: absent competitive
use, there was no injury. Kodak would not lose customers (and thereby
revenue) in the banana or bicycle business because it did not sell goods
in those industries.' 2 And without injury, there was no basis for recovery.
This fairly restrictive approach to trademark law frustrated large
corporations. As their product lines grew and their marks became more
famous, they clamored for more protection.'3 They thought it absurd that
someone should be 'permitted to take a free-ride on their name without
any legal liability whatsoever. The notion that the trademark owner
simply had to tolerate this perceived dissipation of their intellectual
property did not go down easily. 4
Courts responded to this pressure in various ways. Some relaxed the
competitor restriction to allow recovery even where the parties were not,
strictly speaking, competitors, but were in sufficiently "related"
industries to surmise that competitive harm was not remote.'5 Others
continued to apply the more restrictive approach.'6 A resulting tension
existed in the commercial and legal communities.'7 In short, given the
uncertainty of trademark law, one could never be too sure whether one
could use a famous trademark in a wholly unrelated field with immunity.
And, on the other side of things, owners of famous and well-established
marks could not be too sure of the scope of their legal protection.
The tension reached a boiling point in the mid-1920s, as the
Industrial Revolution, with its reliance on mass-production and the need
for a coherent and expansive national branding system, matured. In this
context, a New York attorney named Frank Schechter wrote a law
8
review article entitled The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection.'
9, See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ 2:7, 2:9.
io. Id. § 2:7
ii. d § 24:2.
12. Cf i. § 24 :4 .
13. Cf id. § 24:5.
4. Cf Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L REV. 813
(1927).

15. See McCARmY, supra note 3, § 24:5.

i6. Cf id.
I7.Cf.il
18. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 813.
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Schechter argued that the traditional likelihood of confusion analysis was
too limited and unresponsive to modem commercial realities.'9 He
asserted that, in the (then) contemporary marketplace, trademarks
performed far more than a mere source-identifying function."0 Their chief
function was to form a psychological link between consumers and
producers.' He spoke of the commercial magnetism of marks and argued
that this magnetism was a form of property, developed after valuable
investment, which deserved broader protection than the likelihood of
confusion test afforded. 2
Schechter limited his proposal to famous marks that were either
coined (entirely made-up words) or arbitrary (known words that were
arbitrarily applied to products). 3 He spoke repeatedly of the property
interest that can attach to such marks. 4 The protectable property interest
was the psychological bond between consumer and producer.25 This was a
bond or link that often was not based on any understanding by the
consumer of who actually made the goods. 6 Thus, it was not a sourcesignifying function, as such. 7 But it was a function that deserved legal
protection.i
Schechter offered a mixed rationale for the expanded protection he
proposed. 9 One strand of his thinking tended toward the property
rationale.3" He believed that famous distinct trademarks were a form of
intellectual property that belonged to those who created the marks.3
Schechter suggested these strong trademarks deserved protection from
exploitation in order to honor the investment in time and money that
went into making the mark strong.2 He believed it was wrong for others
to exploit this value regardless of whether the trademark owner was
harmed in any way by the unauthorized collateral use.33 Schechter wrote:
Quite apart from the destruction of the uniqueness of a mark by its use
on other goods... once a mark has come to indicate to the public a
I9. See generallyid
20. Id at 818-i9.
21. Id. at 83I.
22. See id at 819, 829-33.
23. Id. at 828-30. Schechter's proposal applied only to coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks, only to
situations in which the junior user's mark was identical to that of the senior user, and only to use of
identical marks on non-competing goods. See id.
24. See generally id at 813.
25. ld at831.
26. Id at 832-33.
27. Id at 822.
2A Id at 822-24.
29.

See id.

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 823.
Id
Id at 833.
See generally id at 825-3 1
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constant and uniform source of satisfaction, its owner should be
allowed the broadest scope possible for the natural expansion of his
trade to other lines or fields of enterprise.34
Schechter recognized that in some situations another party's use of a
famous trademark is not likely to cause confusion as to the source of the
goods, and yet protection still seems warranted.35 Assume, for example,
that a company sells Kodak bananas. Consumers are not likely to believe
that these bananas originate from the same company that sells Kodak
cameras. Nor are they likely to assume that the camera maker and the
banana supplier are related or affiliated. The sale of Kodak bananas does
not involve the diversion of sales from Kodak, because Kodak is not in
the banana business and therefore cannot lose sales in that business. Still,
in Schechter's view, a banana company should not be allowed to use the
Kodak name for bananas. 6
Another strand of Schechter's thinking tended toward the tort point
of view.37 By tort, I mean the desire to prevent injuries to a trademark

owner (as opposed to the property-based desire to give a trademark
owner broad control over the use of a mark without requiring proof of
imminent harm). 8 To justify his intuition that expanded trademark
protection was warranted in certain circumstances, Schechter posited
that mark owners could be harmed in ways beyond the traditional harm
of losing one's customers due to the use of one's mark by a competitor.39
The harm rationale was a supplement to his property rationale. The chief
harm he exposed was that of a gradual lessening of the commercial
magnetism of a mark if others were allowed to freely copy it in a variety
of non-competing products.'
Schechter never actually used the word "dilution." Rather, he
described a type of harm (the gradual lessening of the mark's capacity to

34. Id. at 823 (internal quotations omitted).
35. See id. at 821-24.
36. See id at 829-30.
37. See id. at 819-24.
38. Tort, in this sense, is distinguished from a property rationale in trademark law. The tort
rationale in trademark law is rooted in its original purpose-the prevention of two particular types of
harm. First, trademark law aimed to prevent the diversion of sales from trademark owners to
counterfeiters through confusingly similar uses of the mark by the counterfeiters. See McCARTI-w,
supra note 3, § 24:2. Second, trademark law sought to avoid a fraud-based injury to consumers who
mistakenly purchased counterfeit goods believing them to be the real thing. The property rationale, by
contrast, refers to the tendency of trademark law to respect an individual's claim that a word is
exclusively hers in a broad range of situations and to enforce her attempts to transfer her ownership
interests in that word to others. For a discussion of how trademark law has increasingly become more
propertized in recent years, see David J. Franklyn, Owning Words in Cyberspace: The Accidental
Trademark Regime, 2OO Wis. L. REv. 1251 (2001). See also Lemley, supra note 2, at 1697-1713;
Lunney, supra note 2, at 4o8-1o.
o.
39. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 824-3
40. See id. at 830-33.
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function as a strong mark) that later came to be called dilution.' In
Schechter's view, a famous mark's strength could be diminished in some
way if other companies were allowed to use the same mark on different
types of goods.' After a while, the famous mark will not be as capable of
cementing the bond between the original mark creator and the public.43
The mark owner has a justifiable interest in preventing this type of harm
from occurring before its economic interests are irreparably injured.'
Schechter described the harm to be avoided as
the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold upon
the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-competing
goods. The more distinctive or unique the mark, the deeper is its
impress upon the public consciousness, and the greater its need for
protection against vitiation or dissociation from the particular product
in connection with which it has been used.45
It took some time for American legislatures to adopt the dilution
cause of action. 46 Massachusetts was the first to do, so in 1947 .47 Other
states followed suit, adopting similar anti-dilution acts. These acts largely
followed only the harm prong of Schechter's original dilution proposal.48
That is, they specified that expanded trademark protection is available
only in situations when the challenged use dilutes the selling power of the
plaintiff's mark.49 They also tended to limit expanded protection to highly
distinct, strong trademarks. °
Theoretically, at least, two types of dilutive harm could trigger
injunctive relief under the state anti-dilution acts.' First, protection was
available upon proof that the plaintiff's mark was likely to suffer a
lessening of the capacity of the mark to perform its source-identifying
function.52 This type of harm is sometimes called dilution by "blurring,"
because the plaintiff's mark is blurred in the mind of consumers due to
the unrestrained use of the same mark by other, unrelated companies. 3
Alternatively, plaintiffs could claim that the challenged use tarnished

41. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 754 & n.145.
o.
42. See Schechter, supranote 14, at 824-3
43. Id. at 829-30.
44 d. at 825.
45. Id.
46. For a discussion of historical developments between the time Schechter made his original
anti-dilution proposal in 1927 and the adoption of the first anti-dilution statutes by various States in
the i94os, see Nelson, supra note 2, at 757-63.
47. See Act of May 2, 1947, 1947 Mass. Acts 307. For the current version of the statute, see MASS.
GEN. LAws ch. I ioB, § 12 (2004).
48. See Nelson, supra note 2, at 760-63.
49. d.
50. Id
51. Id. at76I n.184.
52. Id.
53. Id.
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their reputation. 4 This might occur because the defendant was engaged
5 This type of harm is
in a shady business or made shoddy products.
6
tarnishment5
by
dilution
sometimes called
In the years immediately following the enactment of state antidilution acts, state court judges were reluctant to enforce the acts
literally.57 Inexplicably, they often required plaintiffs to show a likelihood
of consumer confusion or competitive injury. 5 Initial judicial reluctance
to fully enforce state anti-dilution statutes gradually gave way to a more
expansive approach. 9 State courts increasingly treated dilution as an
independent and potent cause of action.6° But trademark owners were
not satisfied with the level of protection offered by state statutes. 6 2
Trademark owners lobbied hard for federal anti-dilution protection.
They asserted that such protection was necessary to bring uniformity to
dilution law, to make federal courts an appropriate venue for dilution
law suits, and to ensure that nationally famous marks enjoy a strong form
of trademark protection on a national level. 63
Partly in response to the extensive lobbying efforts of trademark
owners, Congress finally adopted federal anti-dilution protection in 1995.
The Federal Trademark Dilution Act (FIDA), i5 U.S.C. § I125(c)(I),
54. Id.
55- Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 763-65.
58. Id.; see also Beverly W. Pattishall, The Dilution Rationale for Trademark- Trade Identity
Protection, Its Progress and Prospects, 71 Nw. U. L. REV. 618, 621 (1976) ("[T]he [dilution] concept
seemingly has remained so misunderstood or unpalatable to the judicial taste that it largely has been
ignored by the courts despite the plain dictates of the statutes and the voluminous urgings of the
academics." (footnotes omitted)).
59L See Nelson, supranote 2, at 765-70.
6o. During roughly the same time period (the I94os-i96os), judges also expanded the likelihood
of confusion cause of action. Id. at 758 & n.i68. Originally, that cause of action was limited to direct
competitors. Eventually, it was expanded to include sellers of related goods. More significantly, judges
expanded the concept of confusion to include not only confusion as to source, but also confusion as to
sponsorship or affiliation. Congress picked up on this when it revised the federal Lanham Act in 1989
to assert liability for confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation. See McCARTHv, supra note 3, §§ 23.8;
2z2. This is significant because it arguably rendered dilution law superfluous. Dilution was originally
intended to fill the void created by the fact that the standard likelihood of confusion action was limited
to competitors. The familiar example of this void was that the Kodak camera company could not
enjoin the use of its name by a potato chip maker since the two were not in competition and
consumers were unlikely to assume that the potato chips came from the camera maker (i.e., no source
confusion). Dilution, it was thought, could remedy this problem by enabling the camera maker to
enjoin the potato chip maker on the ground that if there were many different Kodaks, the name would
be weakened as a trademark and this was a harm that the law would prevent. With the expansion of
the likelihood of confusion cause of action to include confusion as to sponsorship or affiliation,
however, it became much more possible for Kodak the camera maker to enjoin Kodak the potato chip
maker, on the theory that consumers might think the two companies were "affiliated."
61. See Nelson, supranote 2, at 765-70.
62. See id. at 768-69.
63. Cf. id. at 766.
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provides:
The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an
injunction against another person's commercial use in commerce of a
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become
famous and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark. 6'

To establish a claim of dilution under the FfDA, a plaintiff must
demonstrate five elements: (i) the senior mark must be famous; (2) the
senior mark must be distinctive; (3) the junior use must be a commercial
use in commerce; (4) the junior use must begin after the senior mark
becomes famous; and (5) the junior use must cause dilution of the
distinctive quality of the senior mark, by lessening the
capacity of the
65
seniormark to identify and distinguishgoods or services.

The fifth element of the FFDA follows the harm rationale for
expanded trademark protection. 66 It defines dilutive harm as trademark
use which causes a "lessening [of] the capacity of the senior mark to
identify and distinguish goods or services." ' The harm imagined is
necessarily progressive. The progressive erosion contemplated by
dilution theory has been nicely explained by Professor McCarthy. 6 He
invites the reader to imagine a pureglass of crystal clear water into which
is placed a single drop of red dye. That first drop might not produce
much change. But eventually, after a number of drops, the water will
turn a distinct form of red. The more drops, the more red it will get.
Dilution as a legal theory works in much the same way. The
economic harm envisioned by dilution has been described as a gradual
64. 15 U.S.C § 1125(c)(I) (2000). The FTDA largely resembles its state-law counterparts, but it is
different in at least three potentially important respects. First, on its face the FTDA permits an
injunction against dilutive uses of "famous" marks. There is no language specifically or even impliedly
prohibiting "tarnishing" uses. Arguably, therefore, the federal act provides a cause of action only for
dilution by blurring and not for dilution by tarnishment. Second, the federal dilution cause of action is
available only for "famous" marks. Most state statutes, by contrast, protect famous or highly
distinctive marks. Third, on its face, the FTDA states that liability follows uses that "cause" dilution.
Most of the state statutes impose liability for conduct that causes or is "likely" to cause dilution. The
United States Supreme Court recently ruled that this difference in terminology means that plaintiffs
pursuing relief under the federal act must prove actual dilution; the mere likelihood that dilutive harm
may occur in the future is not enough. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418, 432-33
(2003).
65. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc, 19i F. 3d 2o8, 215 (2d Cir. 1999); see also McCARIHY,
supra note 3, § 24:89.
66. Recently the United States Supreme Court reinforced the harm-based focus of dilution law by
ruling that the FTDA requires proof of actual dilution as opposed to a mere likelihood that such
dilution will occur sometime in the future. This was a significant development in federal dilution law.
It made it harder to prove dilution in most cases. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 432-33.
67. Nabisco, Inc., 191 F.3d at 215. Although the FTDA does not expressly mention blurring or
tarnishment, judges have it to enjoin both kinds of dilution. See McCARTTHY, supra note 3, §§ 24:94,
24:1o4. The FTDA has also been used to prevent cybersquatting. See id. § 25:77.
68. See McCARTHY, supranote 3, §§ 24:67, 24:68.

69. Id §

24:92.2
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"whittling away" of the commercial magnetism or selling power of a
famous and distinct trademark.' No one knows exactly when a
trademark will be hurt due to multiple diluting uses of the same or a
highly similar mark by others. 7' But dilution theory is premised on the
notion that eventually the famous mark will lose some of its selling
power if multiple, unauthorized uses of the mark are permitted to
proceed.
Until recently, the gradual erosion theory was reflected in dilution
doctrine. An aggrieved party could obtain injunctive relief by showing
that a challenged use, if permitted to continue, would eventually cause
dilutive harm.73 A plaintiff (in most jurisdictions) had to show only that it
was more likely than not that dilution would occur at some point in the
future if defendants and others were permitted to use a trademark that
was the same or highly similar to the plaintiff's famous trademark.74
Plaintiffs did not have to show actual harm.75
Recently, the United States Supreme Court rejected the likelihood
of dilution approach. In Moseley v. Victoria's Secret, the Court ruled that
plaintiffs must show actual dilution. 6 The Court reasoned that the
FTDA, unlike its state law counterparts, does not include language which
explicitly makes likely dilution actionable.' The FTDA states that an7
injunction shall follow whenever the challenged use "causes" dilution. 8

The Court ruled that this language means a plaintiff in a federal dilution
case must prove that its mark has actually begun to be diluted as a result
of the defendant's activities.79 Victoria's Secret, then, represents a
70. Schechter, supranote 14, at 825.
71. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:92.2.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. See Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc, I9i F.3d 208, 224-25 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[We read [the
FTDA] to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether at the instance of the senior
user or the junior seeking declaratory relief, before the dilution has actually occurred."); accord Eli
Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc., 233 F.3d 456, 468 (7th Cir. 2000) (where Seventh Circuit aligned
itself with Second Circuit's finding that a "likelihood of dilution" is sufficient to trigger dilution
remedies under the federal act). But see Ringling Bros. -Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v.
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 17o F. 3d 449, 461 ( 4 th Cir. 1999) (holding that the FTDA provides a
remedy only for actual dilution that has already begun to occur); accord Westchester Media v. PRL
USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 67o (5th Cir. 2000) (aligning itself with the Ringling Bros. actual
dilution holding).
75. See Nabisco, Inc., ii F.3d at 223-25.
76. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 418, 432-33 (2003).
77- Id. at 43378. Federal Trademark Dilution Act, I5 U.S.C. § 1125, iog Stat. 985 (i995).
79. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 434. No one knows exactly what Victoria's Secret means. See
McCARa-iy, supra note 3, § 24:1 I O. For one thing, the ruling seems inconsistent with the gradual
erosion theory that lies at the heart of dilution law. Moreover, the Court in Victoria's Secret stated that
proof of actual dilution does not necessarily entail proof of current economic loss. Apparently, the
court believes it is possible for a famous trademark to be experiencing dilution even though the
products to which it is attached are still just as profitable as they were before the dilution began to
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sharpening of the harm focus in American dilution law.'
II. THE INHERENT INDETERMINACY OF DILUTION LAW
This Article began with the assertion that the primary flaw in
dilution doctrine lies in the fact that dilution is vague and indeterminate,
and that if it is taken seriously as a concept, it is nearly impossible to
prove. This Part seeks to support that assertion.
The primary type of dilution is blurring. The notion here is that
multiple uses of the same mark on different types of products will
eventually blur the distinctive character of the famous trademark and
cause it to lose some of its commercial magnetism and selling power.8
The concept of blurring is complex. It assumes that a mark has a degree
of distinctiveness in the public consciousness and that this degree of
distinctiveness can be measured. It also assumes that multiple uses of the
same trademark can blur that distinctiveness in the public consciousness.
This blurring occurs because consumers no longer associate the famous
mark with only one line of goods or only one source of goods. 82 Dilution
theory further assumes that once blurring occurs, the blurred mark is less
capable of functioning as a strong source identifier for the company that
originally adopted that mark.8" Over time, this lessening of capacity to
the brand and cause
identify goods and services is likely to weaken
84
measurable financial loss to the mark owner.
For example, take the famous trademark Kodak, which is known
primarily as the brand name for a type of camera equipment. If other
companies attempt to use Kodak as their own mark for unrelated goods,
occur. This is a strange and highly dubious assumption. If one is going to require actual dilution, it
would seem much more logical to conclude that this necessarily entails proof of economic harm, as the
Fourth Circuit concluded in the Ringling Bros. decision. RinglingBros., 17o F.3d at 455.
8o. In the wake of the Victoria's Secret decision, the International Trademark Association
("INTA") presented a draft bill to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet and
Intellectual Property. The proposed bill would overrule the Victoria's Secret case and change the
statutory requirement from proof of actual dilution to proof that dilution is merely "likely." If INTA's
proposed bill passes, federal dilution law, like most state dilution law, will require only a showing of
likely dilution as a basis for recovery. See generally Committee Print to Amend the Federal Trademark
Dilution Act: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Courts, the Internet,and IntellectualProperty of the
House Committee on the Judiciary, io8th Cong. 6 (20o4) (describing the draft bill and the hearing held
Apr. 22, 2004).
8I. See McCARTmY, supranote 3, §§ 24:67, 24:68.
82. Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d (9th Cir. 2002) ("The distinctiveness of the mark is
diminished if the mark no longer brings to mind the senior user alone.").
83. See McCARTHy, supra note 3, § 24:68 (Under the "blurring" theory, "[clustomers or
prospective customers will see the plaintiff's mark used by other persons to identify other sources on a
plethora of different goods and services. The unique and distinctive significance of the mark to identify
and distinguish one source may be diluted and weakened. But no confusion as to source, sponsorship,
affiliation or connection has occurred.").
84 Ringling Bros., 17o F.3d at 458 ("[T]he end harm at which [the dilution cause of action] is
aimed is a [diminishment of] the mark's selling power, not its 'distinctiveness' as such.").
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such as bicycles or automobiles, dilution theory would hold that these
uses should be disallowed because they ultimately will weaken the selling
power of the original Kodak mark and thereby injure the commercial
interests of the owner of that mark. Dilution theory further holds that
the owner of the Kodak mark should be empowered to prevent dilution
before it occurs.
The problem with this line of reasoning is that it is built on a series
of curious and ultimately dubious assumptions. 85 First, it is not at all clear
that the degree of distinctiveness of a particular trademark can be
accurately measured. Some marks are more famous than others, but
fame, alone, is not an indicator of mark strength. Mark strength (which is
what is often meant when one refers to mark distinctiveness) is a slippery
concept. Ultimately it refers to the ability of the mark to attract
consumers' attention in a complex and information-rich marketplace. 86
But it is difficult to know why one's goods sell well or why they do not. A
measurement of product sales may be more associated with how
customers feel about a particular product than with a particular brand
name, per se.
Second, and for similar reasons, it is exceedingly difficult to measure
any reduction in mark distinctiveness. Absent clear proof that a
particular brand is losing substantial sales, and that such loss is caused by
the prevalence of other similar marks in the marketplace, one could
never really know whether dilution is occurring. But such proof is hard to
come by. In fact, in most dilution cases, the plaintiff sues before actual
economic harm has occurred. 8" The plaintiff alleges that such harm is
likely to occur if the defendant is permitted to continue to sell similarly
branded goods. And so the inquiry shifts from whether dilution has
occurred to whether it is likely to occur.
It is even more difficult to measure whether dilution is likely to
occur than it is to measure whether it has already occurred. This is so
because the likelihood of dilution occurring in the future necessarily

85. See MCCARTHY, supra note 3, § 24:100 (noting judicial skepticism about dilution by blurring);
see also Walter J. Derenberg, The Problem of Trademark Dilution and the Anti-dilution Statutes, 44
CAL. L. REv. 439, 451 (1956) (raising doubts about dilution theory); George E. Middleton, Some
Reflections on Dilution,42 TRADEMARK REP. 175, 187 (1952) (stating that as of 1952: "So far as I know
no [state law dilution case] case has turned on dilution alone"); David S. Welcowitz, Reexamining
Trademark Dilution, 44 VAND. L. REv. 531, 583-88 (i99i) ("Courts are struggling to define a dilution
theory and to distinguish it from [traditional trademark] infringement when no real theory or
distinction may exist.... If legislatures cannot summon the will to repeal dilution statutes, the statutes
should be limited as much as their language will permit.").
86. McCARThY, supra note 3, § 11:73 ("The legal strength of a mark is usually the same as its
economic and marketing strength").
87. See, e.g., Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc. ioi F.3d 208 (2d Cir. i999) (considering before any
extensive marketing of the defendant's product, whether Nabisco's sale of a gold-fished shaped
cracker would dilute Pepperidge's Farm's famous cracker in the same shape).
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entails a prediction about future events about which the court cannot
hope to know. A judge will never know with any degree of certainty
whether (and how many) other companies are likely to start using marks
that are identical or similar to the plaintiff's famous mark. Nor will the
judge be able to predict whether these future uses of the same mark are
likely to become pervasive. And yet the probability of a number of other
companies widely using the same or a similar mark is critical to the
analysis. If only this one defendant uses a mark that is similar to the
plaintiff, then dilution is much less likely to occur than if multiple parties
use the same mark. For example, if only one candy company uses the
Kodak mark, and if that candy company operates at a fairly low level,
dilution is considerably less likely to occur than if fifty different
companies use the Kodak mark on many different types of products and
all fifty of them are well known.
Even if many companies adopt the mark in the future, there is the
possibility that multiple uses of the same or similar mark will not, in fact,
materially lessen the strength or selling power of the famous mark.88
There is scant empirical evidence that multiple uses of a famous mark
dilute the selling power of the mark in connection with the first class of
products to which it was attached. 9 It takes a certain leap of faith to
assume that multiple uses of a mark on diverse products will necessarily
or even usually or probably weaken a famous mark in connection with
either the first class of goods to which it was attached or even in
connection with the other classes of goods to which it was attached.'
Indeed, if dilution were a real risk, famous mark owners would rarely, if
ever, license their marks for use in collateral markets on a variety of
different types of goods. Yet this type of licensing occurs frequently.9'
This means that famous mark owners that license their marks must
assume that dilution by blurring is not likely to occur merely because
their mark is associated with a number of different and diverse products.
III.

THE HIDDEN INTEREST IN DILUTION LAW: PREVENTING FREE-RIDING

Given these inherent ambiguities in dilution law, it is surprising to
see that plaintiffs have been quite successful in obtaining injunctions in
dilution cases.92 One might have thought that plaintiffs would tend to lose

dilution cases in all but the rare instance when their sales have
measurably declined and they can show a clear causal connection

between that decline and the activities of the particular company that has
88. See Welcowitz, supra note 85, at 539.
89. Id.
9o. Id.
91. See David S. Franklyn, Toward a Coherent Theory of Strict Tort Liability for Trademark
Licensors,72 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 12-13 (1998) (noting the prevalence of collateral market licensing).
92. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 96.
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been using a mark that is identical or similar to the plaintiffs mark. At a
minimum, one would have thought that judges would refuse to grant
injunctions in dilution cases absent compelling evidence showing that a
host of companies were planning to use marks similar to the plaintiff's
mark and that, if allowed to proceed, consumers would indeed buy fewer
of plaintiffs products than they otherwise would have bought.
But this has not been the case. Plaintiffs frequently have won
dilution cases with little more than the assertion that plaintiff's mark was
famous before defendant began using the same or a highly similar mark
without any authorization from the plaintiff.' Judges have been willing
to enjoin such copycat uses of famous marks even when the risk of
dilution by blurring or tarnishment was nothing more than a mere
possibility, and not even a compelling one at that. 94
The reason for this phenomenon is that judges are most likely
vindicating an interest that is quite different than the interests that
dilution law seeks to protect. The hidden interest is a desire to punish
free-riding. There seems to be a basic conviction in the human
consciousness that free-riding is wrong. This conviction is fairly simple
and straightforward and probably accounts for the plaintiff success rate
in dilution cases.
Indeed, given the complexities and ambiguities of dilution theory, it
is odd that trademark law came to focus on dilutive harm as the exclusive
or even dominant mechanism for providing protection beyond the
likelihood of confusion paradigm. This is particularly odd when one
considers that the anti-free-riding impulse provides us with a much
simpler and more compelling rationale for protection of famous
trademarks.
One can think of numerous instances where a trademark ought to be
protected despite the absence of dilutive harm. Take, for example, the
famous trademark Google. It is the name of a popular internet search
engine web site. Suppose I want to sell Google candy bars without
Google's permission. Should it be allowed?' The traditional likelihood
of confusion analysis probably would not provide Google with relief. It is
doubtful anyone would conclude that Google candy bars were
manufactured by the search engine company. Most of us are not aware of
a search engine company being in the candy business. We would not be
confused into buying the candy bars on the mistaken assumption that
they came from the same company that provides excellent search engine
services.
93. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 96.
94. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 96.
95. For a similar case which was recently litigated, see Xtraplus Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. C-oi20425 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
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And yet my strong hunch is that most people would say Google (the
search engine company) deserves protection in this instance. If you asked
them to give a reason why, 99% of them (excluding trademark lawyers)
would provide a rationale that has absolutely nothing to do with dilution.
I have conducted an informal survey of this type. I always get the same
basic answer. People feel strongly that Google is the property of the
Internet search company and that a candy company called Google would
be attempting unfairly to poach or trade off of the good reputation of the
search engine company. People generally feel this type of "free riding" is
wrong. They may not be able to explain why, but their intuitions rarely
comport with anything that resembles dilution theory.
When confronted with this hypothetical, the dilution argument does
not naturally come to mind. It is one of those rare, exotic concepts
invented by lawyers. It is not that a case for dilution cannot be made; it is
just that it is not the natural and most straightforward case to make.
Indeed, the notion that the Google mark would be diluted by the use of
the same mark on candy bars seems far fetched. It is difficult to imagine
the Google mark losing fame or credibility in the search engine industry
because of the use of the same or a similar mark in other industries. The
risk of harm from blurring seems remote at best. It is possible that the
tarnishment type of harm could occur if the Google mark was associated
with an unsavory business practice, but even this type of harm seems
highly speculative. In any event, the possibility of any such harm
occurring seems to be a much weaker and more tenuous rationale for
providing Google with relief than the basic anti-free-riding rationale.
The truth is that dilution law-as actually practiced and applied by
judges-hews more closely to the anti-free-riding rationale than to the
dilution rationale. An empirical review of the case law seems to bear out
the notion that judges are just as likely as lay persons to conclude that
free-riding is wrong in and of itself, and that dilution, as such, is largely
I next discuss four dilution cases to illustrate this
beside the point.
96
phenomenon.
96. I discuss four illustrative cases in this Part. There have been many, many other cases in which
dilution has been used to punish free-riding. In all of these cases, the risk of dilutive harm has been
remote but free-riding was obvious. See, e.g., Nikon Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 96 (2d Cir. I993)
("Ikon" dilutes "Nikon"); Polaraid Corp. v. Polaroid, Inc., 319 F.2d 83o, 837 (7th Cir. 1963)
("Polaraid" dilutes "Polaroid"); Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., I6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1275,
1281 (N.D.N.Y. 199o) ("Wing-Flings" dilutes "Wing-Dings"); Cynthia Grey v. Campbell Soup Co., 650
F. Supp. 1166, 175 (S.D.N.Y. i986) ("Dogiva" dilutes "Godiva"); McDonald's Corp. v. McBagel's,
Inc, 649 F. Supp. 1268, 1281 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) ("McBagel's" dilutes "McDonald's"); Toys R Us, Inc. v.
Canarsie Kidie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, i2o8 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) ("Kids 'r' Us" dilutes "Toys R
Us"). Indeed, courts in a number of cases have been quite clear in explicitly identifying free-riding as
the gist of the dilution cause of action. See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 903 (9th
Cir. 2002) (stating that dilution is about preventing free-riding on mark owners' substantial investment
in famous marks); Playboy Enters. v. Welles, 279 F.3d 796, 8o5 ( 9 th Cir. 2002) (standing for the same

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

A.

[Vol. 56:117

VICTORIA 'S SECRET

One need not look far to find a compelling example of the anti-freerider impulse at work in dilution law. In the very recent Victoria's Secret

case, which eventually made its way to the U.S. Supreme Court, both
lower courts were willing to enjoin the defendant's use of a mark that
was similar to plaintiff's mark because they clearly saw the defendant as
a free-rider. The Court was willing to affirm the injunction even when
there was an absence of any type of clear evidence that dilution was

likely to occur.
In Victoria's Secret, plaintiff owned the famous trademark
"Victoria's Secret" for use on women's lingerie and apparel." It sued a

Lexington Kentucky retail store which called itself "Victor's Secret."
Victor's Secret sold a variety of things, including a slight amount of sexy
women's lingerie and a slightly larger amount of sex toys.' Victor's
Secret changed its name to "Victor's Little Secret," after receiving a
cease and desist letter from Victoria's Secret's lawyers." ° The nationally
famous plaintiff was not impressed with this slight name change, and

promptly brought suit in federal court for garden-variety trademark

infringement and dilution.'1° The district court and Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals both sided with plaintiff on the dilution claim."° Eventually, the
United States Supreme Court overturned the decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings. "
proposition as Mattel); I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 50 (ist Cir. i998) (stating
that dilution protects trademark owners "from an appropriation of or free riding on" the substantial
investment that they have made in their marks). The desire to funnel all manner of anti-free-riding
anger into the dilution mold is not limited to decided cases; to the contrary, one can see numerous
examples of it in pending litigation. Recently, for example, Fox News Channel sued Al Franken, the
former Saturday Night Live comedian, for placing on the bottom of the front cover of his new book
the phrase "Fair and Balanced" -a phrase which Fox previously registered as a trademark. Fox
candidly admits that the essence of its suit is that Franken is attempting to exploit the fame of a phrase
that Fox allegedly made famous. This suit raises serious issues about language sharing and the proper
boundaries of any cause of action that seeks to vindicate the anti-free-riding impulse. See infra Part V.
97. See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc, 537 U.S. 48, 425 (2003).
98. Id. at 422.
99. Id. at 422-23.
ioo. Id. at 423.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 425-26.
1o3. Id. The Supreme Court reversed after finding that the FTDA requires proof of actual as
opposed to merely likely dilution. Because the law was not clear on this point prior to the Court's
ruling, the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. Undoubtedly, the
Court's ruling makes it harder to prove dilution and it makes the dilution cause of action less
susceptible to use as a general anti-free-rider statute. The Court understandably wanted to limit
dilution, probably because of its own perception that an unlimited anti-free-riding statute was a bad
thing. As I show more fully below, the Court got it wrong. The free-riding impulse should be limited.
But not by a strict focus on harm. If, as I contend, the impulse has deep and compelling theoretical
justification, then it is likely that the impulse will simply find its expression elsewhere in trademark
law. Perhaps lower court judges will further stretch the likelihood of confusion analysis to punish free-
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The lower court decisions in Victoria's Secret provide clear examples
of the anti-free-rider impulse at work. The possibility that the use of
Victor's Secret could dilute Victoria's Secret was remote. Victor's Little
Secret was a small operation in a small Kentucky town." The location of
its store, nature of its business, and look and feel of its operation all
precluded consumers from assuming that it had any connection with the
plaintiff. There was no proof that Victoria's Secret had lost its luster as a
trademark.
However, Victor's Secret was free-riding on Victoria's Secret name.
In these circumstances, it did not really matter to either the district court
or the appellate court that the possibility of dilutive harm (i.e., blurring
or tarnishment) was remote. There was free-riding. That was all that
mattered.

B. THE WAWA CASE
Another example of how dilution rhetoric can serve as a malleable
vehicle for the anti-free-riding impulse is found in WaWa v. Haaf." In
WaWa, plaintiff owned a successful and prominent chain of convenience
stores in Pennsylvania and surrounding areas.' Defendants, apparently
wishing to trade on plaintiff's fame, started a single convenience store
called HaHa.7 Plaintiff sued defendants on several grounds, but
ultimately proceeded only on a dilution theory."0 Plaintiff contended that
the selling power of the WaWa name was being undermined and diluted
by defendants' use of HaHa as a similar name for a convenience store."'9
They produced no proof of actual harm.
Defendants explained that they picked the HaHa name as an
abbreviation for their family name, Haaf."° The district judge would have
none of it. In issuing an injunction, he reasoned that "[a]lthough Mr.
Haaf denies predatory intent, I am dubious ..... The court thought there
was a "parody problem" in defendants' use, which, when combined with
the fact that defendants' HaHa mark was itself distinctive and easy to
remember, made it likely that plaintiff's famous WaWa mark would be
"blurred" in the minds of consumers.
riders. Perhaps they will ignore parts of Victoria's Secret or confine it to its facts or find a way to wiggle
around it. But they are not likely to simply abandon the desire to punish free-riders. See infra Part IV.
Io 4 See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 423.
105. 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996), aff d without opinion, u16 F.3d 471 (3d Cir.
'997).
io6. Id at i63o-3i.
io7. Id at 1631.
io8. Id at 1632-33.
ioo. Id. at 1631-32.
11o. ldMat 1632.
ii. Id.
iiz Id. at 1633.
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The court never stopped to explain why such blurring was likely.
Plaintiff offered a survey showing that some twenty nine percent of
respondents thought of plaintiff's business when encountering
defendants' store name (on the survey form)."3 But neither the parties
nor the court explained why this mere association was likely to "blur" the
distinctiveness of plaintiff's mark.
The opinion can only be explained as an expression of the anti-freeriding impulse. Indeed, the court almost acknowledges as much when it
focuses on "predatory intent." Such intent, strictly speaking, ought to be
irrelevant to the dilution inquiry. Dilution is about likely effects-i.e., the
probability that numerous uses of a famous mark will diminish its selling
power. It is not supposed to be about predatory intent. Yet courts, as
here, often talk of such intent in dilution opinions."4 This fact alone
illustrates that they are as concerned about preventing free-riding as they
are about preventing any sort of harm to a mark. The court's decision in
Wawa honestly acknowledges the free-riding factor."5
C.

LEXINGTONMANAGEMENTCORPORATIONv LEXINGTONCAPITAL PARTNERS

The primacy of the anti-free-riding impulse is also evident in the
court's opinion in the case of Lexington Management Corp. v. Lexington
Capital Partners.",There, the plaintiff, a 401(k) fund manager, sued
defendant, a retail securities broker, for traditional trademark
infringement and dilution due to defendant's use of the "Lexington"
name in the financial services industry.' There was no evidence of actual
confusion and little possibility of any shared customers between the two
companies-plaintiff dealt mainly with institutional investors 8as a mutual
fund manager, whereas defendant dealt with retail investors."
Plaintiff presented no evidence that its mark was famous nationally
or in the financial services industry in particular. Nor did it explain how
defendant's use of the word "Lexington" in its own name could dilute the
selling power of plaintiff's mark. Indeed, such dilution was highly
unlikely given the fact, as defendant asserted, that over 3,400 businesses
were already using the Lexington mark nationally in one business or
another, and that several of those uses related to financial services."'
On these facts, the court nevertheless ruled for the plaintiff, on both

113. Id. at 1632.
"14- See, e.g., id at 1633.
115. Id. The fact that the opinion was affirmed by the Third Circuit (without opinion) arguably
reflects the appellate court's agreement with the outcome and unwillingness to dissect the lower
court's rationale.
116. lO F. Supp. 2d 271, 290 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
117. Id at 274.
I18.

Idat276.

19 Id. at 275-76.

November 2004]

DEBUNKING DILUTION DOCTRINE

its likelihood of confusion and dilution causes of action.'2" While the
court stated that there was no firm evidence that defendant acted in "bad
faith" in selecting the Lexington name, plaintiff's "strong and widespread
presence in the investment market and press makes it unlikely that
defendant could not have known of plaintiff's business and trademark
rights.' 2' The court also noted that whereas plaintiff began using the
Lexington mark in the mid-i98os, defendant did not include Lexington in
its name until 1997. Prior to that time, defendant was called First
Hanover Securities.' In these circumstances, the court apparently
believed that defendant was attempting to capitalize inappropriately on
plaintiffs existing reputation generally in the financial services industry.
Based on this belief, the court was willing to enjoin defendant from using
the Lexington mark in any
manner whatsoever-despite the lack of
3
evidence of dilutive harm.I
D.

TIMES MIRROR MAGAZINE V. LAS VEGAS SPORTS NEWS

In Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News," 4
plaintiff was the owner of the trademark "Sporting News," which had
been used as the name of a sports magazine since I886."2s Plaintiff's
magazine provided its readers with information on baseball, basketball,
football, and hockey, and had a weekly circulation of approximately
540,000 customers in the United States.2 6
Defendant originally published a gambling news magazine in Las
Vegas under the name "Las Vegas Sports News," but changed its name
in 1997 to "Las Vegas Sporting News," in an effort to boost sales.7
Defendant's magazine contained articles, editorials, and advertisements
on sports wagering for "the sports gaming enthusiast. '' ..
Plaintiff sued defendant solely on a dilution theory.'29 The district
court found for plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed.'3" The appellate
court held that the plaintiff's mark was sufficiently famous in its "niche
market" to qualify for protection under the FTDA.'3' The Court also
found that defendant's use was likely to blur the distinctiveness of

120.

Id

at 290.

Id. at 287 n.12.
122. Id. at 276.
123. Id at 283.
124. 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000).
125. Id at i6o.
121.

126. Idat 16I.

Id.
Id.
129L Id. at 162.
130. Id at 170.
131. Id. at 164-65.
127.

128.
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plaintiff's mark in the mind of consumers.3

The Court's holding cannot be explained on a dilution rationale.
There was no evidence that purchasers of plaintiff's magazine had come
to associate plaintiff's mark with gaming; nor was there a serious risk that
that would occur in the future. Rather, both the district and appellate

courts seemed genuinely troubled by the fact that defendant clearly had
attempted to take a free-ride on the superior notoriety and good

reputation of plaintiffs publication.'33
IV.

TOWARD A MORE COHERENT ANTI-FREE-RIDER THEORY

In the foregoing Part, I showed that judges appear to frequently use
dilution law as a mechanism for vindicating the anti-free-riding impulse,
even when dilutive harm is remote. Accepting that this phenomenon
exists, there are two possible responses. One could conclude that the

judicial inclination to punish free-riding through the malleable vehicle of
dilution law is wrong and should be stopped. Perhaps this is one reason
the United States Supreme Court recently attempted to rein in federal

dilution with the new requirement that plaintiffs prove actual dilution."
On this view, the problem is not with the harm requirement, as such, but
rather with how slippery it has been and how easy it has been to avoid.

The remedy, if one accepts this approach, is to make harm a more central
and meaningful component of dilution law. In this way, the judicial
tendency to vindicate the anti-free-rider impulse in cases where dilution
Id. at i69-7o.
133. The use of dilution law to punish free-riders in the absence of blurring or tamishment can also
be seen in the early cybersquatter cases. Prior to the adoption of the federal Anti-Cybersquatting
Protection Act ("ACPA") in 1999, plaintiffs' claims were usually funneled into the dilution mold. It
was a poor fit. Judges did not like cybersquatting. They clearly thought it a form of free-riding that
should be stopped. They therefore found little difficulty in stretching standard dilution law to achieve
that end. One of the first instances of cybersquatting to be enjoined under the FTDA occurred in
Intermaticv. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227, 1241 (N.D. Ill. 1996). Mr. Toeppen had reserved hundreds of
famous trademarks as Internet domain names before the trademark owners could do so. The district
court granted summary judgment against Toeppen on the dilution count. The result in Toeppen
cannot be squared with the theory of dilution or the wording of the FTDA. Toeppen did not dilute the
selling power of the Panavision trademark through blurring or tarnishment. It is probable that the
judges were convinced that Mr. Toeppen was attempting to reap where he had not sown. He was a
classic free-rider.
The impulse to punish free-riding in the cybersquatting context is not limited to the judicial arena. The
ACPA itself is a legislative expression of the anti-free-riding impulse. Because some judges thought it
intellectually dishonest to punish cybersquatting through the dilution cause of action, they refused to
enjoin activity that clearly counted as free-riding. Congress eventually elevated the anti-free-riding
impulse to a statutory cause of action in the ACPA. Courts increasingly interpret the ACPA to punish
free-riding whenever the defendant has used a famous mark as part of its domain name with
knowledge of the mark's fame. See, e.g., Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 157 F. Supp.
2d 658, 679 (E.D. Va. 2001) (granting summary judgment against cyber-squatter largely due to the
anti-free-rider impulse, where bad faith arguably should have been a triable issue of fact); see also
Xtraplus Corp. v. Google, Inc., No. C-o-2o425 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
134. See supra Part I.
132.
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is highly unlikely might be minimized.
Another possible approach-and the one I advance here-is to
embrace the anti-free-rider impulse as a legitimate basis for an
independent form of trademark protection. My thesis in this Article is
that the anti-free-rider impulse should be embraced and turned into a
separate form of trademark protection. This thesis is ultimately grounded
in the notion that strict adherence to dilution theory would not naturally
protect famous marks from free-riders. Rather, courts should continue to
enjoin free-riding, but under an explicit, coherent theory that has little to
do with dilution. In the paragraphs that follow, I offer a theoretical
construct which might be used as the basis for anti-free-riding legislation
that does not rely on traditional dilution principles like blurring and
tarnishment. I first lay out the basic justifications for preventing freeriding on famous marks. I then apply those justifications in the context of
a hypothetical case.
A.

JUSTIFYING THE ANTI-FREE-RIDER IMPULSE

The anti-free-rider cause of action in trademark law finds its
strongest justification in a blended rationale that focuses on the
respective rights and interests of the famous mark creator and the party
who wishes to knowingly exploit that mark for clear commercial gain.
Because the justification process is necessarily contextual, I refer to it as
an "as between" type of argument. That is, as between the famous mark
owner, who frequently expends some time, effort, and money to create
and maintain the mark's fame, and a third party who did nothing to
create that fame but nevertheless wishes to exploit it, we generally have
no trouble siding with the famous mark owner. The intuition here is
based on a vague and often unarticulated but still defensible sense of the
equities of the situation.
On the one side, we consider the interests of the mark owner. The
mark owner gets credit for selecting a catchy word or phrase as a mark
and for investing time, money, and energy to make the mark famous.
Fame does not usually come to a mark overnight or by accident. It takes
planning and considerable economic investment to make most marks
famous. We feel that that investment generally deserves protection. We
also believe that the famous mark creator should be allowed to capture
the full economic rewards of her investment and to control how her
investment is utilized. In disputes with free-riders, that usually means
requiring the free-rider to obtain some sort of license from the mark
owner.
When examined more closely, these basic intuitions about the
interests of the famous mark owner appear to be grounded in a multifaceted rationale. One strand of the rationale relies on the labor theory

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56: 117

of property rights.'35 Intellectual property rights (outside the trademark
context) have long been justified in part by the labor theory of
property.' The notion here is that one deserves to own the fruits of
one's labor.'37 John Locke posited that if a human being can be said to
own her own body, it follows that she should own the fruits of her body's
labors.' 3s This means that the laborer has a superior right to control the
fruits of her labor and to capture benefits which those labors might
generate.39 As applied here, Lockean labor theory supports our intuition
that famous mark owners deserve to own and control marks which they
40
made famous and to capture the economic benefits that they generate.'
The other strand of the "as between" rationale finds support in
economic incentive theory.'4 ' Lurking in the "as between" rationale is a
set of economic assumptions about optimal mark investment. One
assumption is that free-riding prevents a famous mark owner from
capturing the full financial benefits of her mark.' This appears to be a
valid assumption. If a company knows it can license its famous and highly
distinct marks in all fields-even to those who wish to use the mark on
totally unrelated types of goods-it will have a strong incentive to create
a famous mark.'43 Economists might refer to this as internalizing the
benefits of creating a famous name.'" The famous mark owner is in the
best position to decide to whom the mark should be licensed and to
ensure that the mark is utilized in the most efficient and economically
desirable manner. Uncontrolled free-riding thus provides a drain on the
optimal use of prestigious marks.
It is important to note that considerations of harm-even dilutive
harm-are not necessarily wholly absent from how we view the potential
property interests of the famous mark owner. It is possible that lurking in
the background of the judicial (or lay) imagination is a feeling that
uncontrolled use of a famous mark could eventually hurt the mark owner
is some way. (Just as it is possible that lurking in the background of real
property protection is some vague notion that trespass to property could
135. See, e.g., Lawrence C. Becker, Deserving To Own IntellectualProperty, 68 Cm.-KErr. L. REv.
609, 6Io ('993); Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEo. L.J. 287, 296-301
(1988); Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor and Possession, 51 OHo ST. L.J.
517, 536-38 (990).
136. Yen, supranote 135, at 536-38.
137. See Becker, supra note 135, at 615.
13& See Hughes, supra note 135, at 296.
I39 Id at 299
I4O. See id.
141. See William i. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of Trademark Law, 78
TRADEMARK REP. 267, 278 (I988).
142. Id. at 344.
143. See Ty Inc. v. Perryman, 306 F.3 d 509, 510 (7th Cir. 2002)
I44. Id. at 512-13 (discussing the internalization concept with regard to famous marks and dilution
theory).
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harm the property owner in some way.)'45 Whether the harm could come
in the form of "tarnishment" or "blurring" or even in some other sense is
not particularly clear. But we are not troubled by that lack of clarity,
because the immanency or likelihood of harm is not paramount-or even
necessary to-the "as between" analysis. The gist of that analysis is that
the famous mark owner created something of value, and that as between
her and the third party user, the former should be able to control the
famous mark.
On the other side of the equation, we evaluate the interests of the
person who wishes to use a mark that is identical or highly similar to a
famous mark. Here we often find little to commend the would-be famous
mark user/emulator. Her motive frequently is clear: she selected the
mark in question because of its similarity to a famous mark. We likely
will conclude that she must have known what she was doing, even in the
absence of clear proof, because of the fame of the mark she attempted to
copy.' 6 One would have to be cloistered not to know what one was doing
in most of these cases.
The attempt to make a profit off of some one else's fame troubles us.
There seems to be something unseemly about this type of profiteering.
Our concern here is precisely the opposite of the intuition that underlies
our sympathy with the famous mark owner. There we felt that the mark
owner deserved to control her mark because she created it and made it
famous. Here, on the other hand, we see someone trying to exploit fame
they did not create. They are trying to obtain credit for a something they
did not earn. This attempted exploitation appears to be a form of
unearned advantage seeking that troubles us. In the words of the
metaphor, we believe that one is attempting to reap where one has not
sown. At bottom, the conduct is seen as a type of theft, and, as such, it is
adjudged to be morally wrong.
Our moral condemnation is intensified by the fact that in many
instances we cannot identify any kind of justification for free-riding on
famous trademarks. The free-rider usually did not need to use the
famous mark. Nor can we see any benefit to allowing her to use it. There
does not seem to be any collective gain from allowing such free-riding to
occur. Unlike other areas of intellectual property law, free-riding on a
famous trademark does not further innovation or technological
advancement.'47 Thus, while unrestrained free-riding on famous marks
145. See Wendy J. Gordon, Toward a Jurisprudenceof Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the
Problem of Private Censorship, 57 U. Cmt. L. REv. oo9, io45 (099o) (discussing the significance of the
harm concept in Lockean property theory).
146. See, e.g., Wawa v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1629, 1632 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (acknowledging
that despite the lack of proof, the court was dubious about the defendant's assertion that he was not
attempting to free-ride on the name and reputation of the plaintiff).
147. In patent law, by contrast, there may be pro-innovation and pro-creativity reasons to allow
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imposes impediments to optimal mark investment, it also appears to

provide no countervailing economic benefit to society.'48
A final point to notice about the "as between" rationale is that it
does not wholly depend on the strength of any one of the strands that
comprise it. That is, we are still persuaded of its overall viability despite
the fact that in an individual case one element of the rationale does not
provide support for a mark owner. 149 For example, in some instances, it
may be doubtful that a particular mark owner did much to make her

mark famous (and thus Lockean labor theory alone would not support
her property claim). In other cases, we might doubt that a particular
famous mark owner would really wish to license her mark broadly or that
anybody would really pay her money to use the mark in such unrelated

industries (and thus economic incentive theory alone might not support
her property claim). In still other instances, we might be quite doubtful
that the accused use is likely to harm the mark owner in any clear way'5
(and thus dilution theory alone might not support her property claim).
The reason why such individually weak elements do not necessarily
defeat the "as between rationale" is because it is always a comparative
analysis.'"' The plaintiff may have a relatively weak property claim, but
the defendant often has no justification whatsoever for her free-riding.
We are willing to give the plaintiff the benefit of the doubt on how much
labor or money she expended to make her mark famous or on how
important the lost licensing fee is to her because we can see no
compelling benefit that comes from the defendant's free-riding. In the

end, it is a question of control. We believe that the famous mark owner
free-riding. The same is often true in copyright. But a similar case cannot be made here. No economic
good is furthered when, for example, a bagel company calls its bagels "McBagels," or a bicycle
company calls itself "Kodak Bicycles" or a children's store calls itself "Kids-R-Us." In each of these
instances, free-riding on a famous mark imposes social costs without providing a countervailing social
gain.
148. It might be argued that there would be some economic value to allowing unauthorized third
parties to use famous marks (even famous coined marks that were made up and made famous by
others), on the ground that such use might enable them to start companies or new product lines that
would otherwise be difficult to start. On this theory, the added boost of the famous mark would give
the would-be market entrant immediate recognition and visibility that could mean the difference
between selling the new product or not selling it. And this economic value of the famous mark might
be wasted if the mark owner does not want to exploit it in this manner. While I suppose there is some
merit to this possibility, it would seem that if such economic value were truly there, a rational mark
owner would license the use of the mark for a mutually agreeable price. In any event, someone
(presumably the mark owner) needs to weigh the economic benefit that might be derived from such
collateral uses against the harms that could come to the famous mark from either overexposure
(blurring) or tarnishing exposure.
149. See Edwin C Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 8 PHIL. & PUB.AFF. 31,51-52 (1989).
150. Of course, there be may harm in the circular sense of lost licensing fees. This is a circular
conception of harm because it assumes that one has a property-based right to receive the licensing fees
in the first place.
15 . See generally Hettinger, supra note i49, at 78.
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should be the one to decide whether she is threatened by third party use
52
or can capture a financial benefit that her famous mark made possible.
To summarize, then, the anti-free-riding impulse appears to be
embedded in a crude and unarticulated cost/benefit analysis. On the
property side, it relies on vague notions about the degree of labor and
monetary investment (initial mark selection, continued advertising,
marketing efforts, and the like) that go into making a mark famous. It
concludes that this investment deserves protection as a general matterto enable the mark owner to capture the full economic benefit of the
fame she created and to control against potentially harmful uses by
others. On the free-riding side, it generally assumes that the third party
had improper motives, that the conduct was morally reprehensible, and
that free-riding on famous marks does not provide any social or
economic benefit. Finally, because the defendant's interests in such cases
are often so weak, we generally are inclined to give plaintiffs
considerable latitude in protecting their famous marks.
B.

ILLUSTRATING THE

"As BETWEEN"

RATIONALE

It may be useful to return to our Google hypothetical to explore the
contours of the "as between" rationale in the context of a concrete
152. The free-rider impulse finds similar grounding as a component of an "as between" type of
argument in other areas of intellectual property law. Indeed, the basic structure of the argument is
found in the famous United States Supreme Court case which is often cited as the basis for the
common law tort of misappropriation. See Int'l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, at 242
(1918) (holding that plaintiff had a property right in "hot news" which was protectable against
misappropriation by a competing news service); see also McCARThY supra note 3, § 10:48 (discussing
same). The tort of misappropriation, in certain circumstances, prevents free-riding on intellectual
property that is not otherwise protected by copyright, patent, or trademark secret. See id.
The anti-free-riding impulse (and the as between rationale) also finds expression in the right
of publicity. The reasoning might proceed as follows. As between a famous person (the celebrity) who
arguably expended some time, effort, and money to create and maintain her fame, and a third party
who wishes to exploit the famous person's identity (perhaps by putting her picture on coffee mugs), we
generally have no trouble siding with the famous person. We feel she has a superior right to capture
the economic rewards of her fame. We feel this way despite the fact that she may have done little to
create her fame (and thus a property right is not well-founded on a labor theory alone). We also feel
this way despite the fact that any harm to the celebrity's reputation from third party use may be
remote (notice that we do not require the famous person to prove blurring, tarnishment, or anything
even remotely like these concepts). We believe that the celebrity should have control of this assetshe should be the one to decide whether she is threatened by the third party use. And we believe that
the third party is a free-rider. She is attempting to reap the benefit of celebrity fame even though she
had nothing to do with the creation of that fame. Absent countervailing considerations such as the
defendant's free speech rights, we are often inclined to find for the famous plaintiff. See, e.g., Alice
Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of Publicity, 49 DUKE L.J. 383, 422 (1999)
(noting the implicit balance between competing property and use claims in the context of the right of
publicity); see also J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICrrY AND PRIVACY §§ 2:1-2:5 (2d ed.
20o3) (discussing the basic rationales for the right of publicity). A similar as between type of argument
has also been offered to justify protecting famous sports logos and the like against free-riding even in
the absence of a likelihood of confusion or dilution. See Robert C. Denicola, InstitutionalPublicity
Rights: An Analysis of Merchandisingof Famous Trade Symbols, 62 N.C. L REV. 603 (1984).
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factual scenario. There, we supposed that the Google name was used
without permission by a candy company and we asked whether this
should be allowed. Employing the "as between" analysis, we see that the
founders of the Google search engine company have invested substantial
time, money, and effort to make the Google brand a valuable
commodity.
The selection of the Google name also apparently entailed some
degree of creativity. Google does not readily spring to mind as a suitable
or natural name for a search engine company. Picking the name
undoubtedly involved a prior search to make sure it was not similar to
the name of any other search engine company. Indeed, the Google name
appears to have been derived from the word "googol," which signifies
the number one followed by a hundred zeros. Perhaps the implication
was that the Google search engine has a search capacity that is at least as
large as this huge number. This combination of creativity in selection and
monetary investment in advertising to make the mark famous counsels in
favor of granting the Google mark owners a strong property right.
On the other side of the equation, we analyze the interests of the
company that wishes to use Google as a name for candy. The fame of
Google fosters a strong presumption that the candy company is operating
with full knowledge of Google's fame as a search engine trademark and
is attempting to exploit that fame. There also does not appear to be any
justification for allowing the candy company to do so. An almost limitless
number of names would be equally good for a candy company (if one
puts aside the advantage they are attempting to gain by capitalizing off of
Google's fame). And the candy company cannot claim that the Google
name in any way uniquely suits their particular product or is necessary
for them to effectively compete in the candy business.
In these circumstances, we are justifiably inclined to find for
Google.
Our conviction is based first and foremost on our reasonable conclusion
that the founders of Google have certain investment-backed expectations
and that those expectations deserve legal protection. Our conviction is
also based on the fact that the candy company has no apparent reason
for free-riding on the fame that Google created. Lurking in the back of
our minds may be a concern that failing to protect Google could subject
Google to some type of harm.
We may be justifiably concerned that if Google loses control over its
mark, others might be able to use the mark in ways that could wash back
on the search engine company to its detriment. But we do not feel
compelled to make an actual finding that such harm has already begun to
occur. Nor do we feel that Google should be required to prove a
likelihood that it will suffer such harm in the immediate future. Our
desire to provide Google with sufficient control to prevent such harm is
grounded in a more basic sense that free-riding is wrong in this situation
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and that Google has a right to control the use of this particular name. In
short, we have no difficulty deferring to Google as the entity best
situated to decide whether another party's use of its name is likely to
harm it in the future.
We also are inclined to allow Google to decide whether it wishes to
license its mark for this particular use. We believe Google has a superior
interest in capturing collateral licensing fees from the use of its name.
Whether it actually would be willing to license its mark to this particular
candy company is largely beside the point. Again, when we compare
Google's right to profit from its investment in its name to the utter lack
of justification for the candy company's use, we are justifiably inclined to
allow Google to decide whether licensing its mark is in its best interest.
To summarize, then, in Part I have demonstrated that there are good
reasons to vindicate the anti-free-riding impulse in trademark law and
that those reasons are only remotely related to considerations of
traditional dilution concepts like blurring and tamishment. I have argued
that broad protection for famous marks can be grounded most
convincingly in an "as between" type of analysis that compares the
investment of the mark owner to the justifications, if any, for free-riding.
When such justifications are lacking, we are right to conclude that the
trademark owner should prevail.
V. FINDING LIMITS
Having sought to justify the basic impulse that causes judges to
enjoin free-riding in the trademark context and to locate that impulse as
a component in a multi-faceted analysis, I am not unmindful of the
reasons why many courts and commentators may be reluctant to
recommend this broad form of trademark protection. There may be a
fear that a cause of action which prohibits free-riding without any proof
of clear and definable types of harm (such as blurring and tarnishment
purport to be) would be far too broad. 53 Such a cause of action could be
difficult to control, and it might trample on other important interests of
persons and companies that are searching for new trademarks. In short,
it may be far too unwieldy an instrument to place into the hands of
judges.
These are legitimate fears, but they are largely unfocused. For one
thing, this view assumes that current dilution law cabins the anti-freeriding impulse in a meaningful way. As I have shown above, dilution law
has not offered an effective set of mechanisms to limit the anti-freeriding impulse.'" The focus on harm as a limit has superficial appeal, but
153. See Swann & David, supra note
protection).
154. See supra Part II.

2,

at 225 (noting reasons why some might fear broad brand

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

this appeal dissipates once

[Vol. 56:iI17

one realizes how speculative

and

indeterminate dilutive harm is. Courts have not done a particularly good
job in applying dilution in a way that would 5make it a coherent and
predictable-and thus well-bounded-concept.
More fundamentally, it ought to be possible to articulate meaningful
limits on a free-riding cause of action without resort to dilution principles
like blurring and tarnishment., 6 Requiring a finding of economic harm to
the famous mark is not necessarily the only way, or even the best way, to
limit the anti-free-riding impulse.'57 As I show below, a more significant
set of limits can be found by focusing on the language sharing and
expressive freedom interests of persons who wish to use marks that are
identical or similar to famous marks.'5

A.

STARTING WITH A HYPOTHETICAL CASE

As we have seen, dilution is not the most natural and compelling
rationale for providing anti-free-riding protection to famous marks. It is
also not the most natural mechanism for articulating effective and
meaningful limits on the free-riding concept. One can think of instances
where free-riding on a famous mark seems justifiable, but not because
that free-riding is unlikely to dilute the selling power of the famous mark.
Take, for example, the famous trademark Amazon.com. As we all know,
that mark is used to sell a host of on-line products, the main bulk of
which are books. Suppose someone decides to name their jungle
expedition travel agency "Amazon Travel." Should this be allowed?
I suspect that most people would answer this question in the
affirmative. But, again, their assessment would have little, if anything, to
do with the standard dilution law. Again, my point here is not that a non155. Id. See also supra note 85.
i56. Blurring is the typical form of dilution. It means that a famous mark's commercial magnetism
will become blurred, and therefore less capable of functioning as a strong brand identifier, if other
companies are allowed to use the same mark (or a similar mark) to sell a variety of unrelated goods.
Tarnishment is the other principal form of dilution. This refers to cases where unauthorized uses of a
famous mark tarnish its image by associating it with an unwholesome or lower quality product. For a
more complete discussion of these concepts, see supra Part I.
157. Indeed, a strong argument exists that the harm-based focus of dilution law is a proxy for
deeper concerns-concerns which are more accurately rooted in beliefs about language sharing and
expressive freedom. These interests may be thought too indefinite, however, to serve as determinate
limits. Harm is thought more certain. However, as I have shown above, harm itself is a vague and
malleable concept in dilution law. It offers a false sense of security as a limiting concept. It often
operates as a mask for the true countervailing interests which need to be considered. For a more
complete discussion of this topic, see supra Part III.
158. My claim here is that dilution law is at once too broad and too narrow. It offers too little (and
too uncertain) protection to too broad a category of words. A more appropriate doctrine protecting
famous marks should offer a far simpler and more potent form of protection to a much smaller set of
words. The proposal advanced here would provide an expansive property right-which is broader than
the right to be free from dilutive uses-but it would limit that right to certain types of trademarks (i.e.,
coined or quasi-coined words).
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dilution rationale could not be constructed. Rather, my point is that
dilution is an unnatural and largely unnecessary analytical tool in this
context. It is much more likely that people would think Amazon Travel
ought to be allowed to utilize the word Amazon as part of their own
name because the word Amazon was not invented by the owners of
Amazon.com and because Amazon is the name of a jungle river and thus
somehow linked to the nature of the travel agency's business. In short,
people would intuitively conclude that Amazon.com's property interests
are relatively weak and that the travel agency's reasons for using the
Amazon name are strong. Indeed, they may even be inclined to stick to
this analysis in the face of evidence that the travel agency selected
Amazon as part of its name in part because of the popularity of
Amazon.com.
By contrast, in the earlier Google hypothetical, where we imagined a
candy company calling itself Google Candy, we were strongly inclined to
protect the famous mark owner. This intuition probably was grounded
largely in our sense that Google is a strange and quirky name carefully
selected by the Google search engine company and our sense that the
candy company had no business-related reason to use Google as part of
its name (aside from the obvious free-riding profit-seeking reason).
The different intuitive reactions to the Amazon.corn hypothetical
(where free-riding seems acceptable) and the Google hypothetical
(where free-riding seems unacceptable) are due to the nature of the
famous mark involved in each case, and the reasons why the other party
was using a mark which was identical or similar to the famous mark. I
explore each of these factors in greater detail below.

B.

FAMoUs MARK
The most significant limit on the free-riding impulse relates, not to
the possibility of dilutive harm, but rather to the nature of the famous
mark for which protection is sought. The more the famous mark appears
to be an invented, coined, or made up word, the more inclined we are to
protect it against any and all free-riding. The more it appears to be a
common, descriptive, or already existing word, the less we are inclined to
protect it against any and all free-riding. This inclination is based, in part,
on our collective notions of labor and reward. We have inherited the
general Lockean notion that the reward of property should follow some
type of expenditure of labor. "' We are not inclined to give people strong
property rights when they expend little or no effort in creating something
of value. 16° By contrast, we are inclined to give relatively greater property
THE NATURE OF THE

159. See JOHN LoCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 305 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
1967) (i690).
i6o. See id.
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rights to people who expend labor to invent new things.
Patent law and copyright law are prime examples of how both
inclinations have been used to construct broad sets of intellectual
property rights. 6' Trademark law is not usually thought to rest on
Lockean labor theory. 6'But it does. This is just another example of the
labor instinct at work. It takes a degree of intellectual labor and
creativity to invent a new word for use as a trademark and to then make
that invented mark famous. By contrast, it takes relatively little effort to
simply pluck an existing word from the known and obvious lexicon of
existing words and to then make that word famous. In short, we are
inclined to believe that the invented word somehow belongs to its creator
in a way that does not necessarily apply to the plucked word.
C.

LANGUAGE SHARING

The second reason why we are inclined to protect Google but not
Amazon in these hypothetical cases is because of the language sharing
interests of the alleged free-rider. We can see how one might have a good
reason to call one's jungle travel agency Amazon Travel. Amazon is a
common word that existed and had a real world meaning (it is the name
of a South American river) before Amazon.com made it famous for online book sales. A jungle travel agency can, therefore, reasonably claim
part of its reason for naming itself Amazon Travel is to tap into this preexisting meaning. We are inclined to sympathize with this type of choice
because we generally believe that all people should have an equal right
to use common pre-existing words so long as they do not thereby harm
others.'" In this situation, the travel agency seems to have a natural and
161. See Hughes, supra note 135, at 319-40.
162. The traditional justification for trademark law is that it is designed to protect consumers
against misbranded products and producers from the injury that such confusion may cause. See
McCmRTHY, supranote 3, §§ 2:1-2:7.
163. The basic "Abercrombie continuum"-which runs through all of trademark law-purports to
offer a sliding scale of rights to trademark owners based on the nature of a particular mark. See
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1976). Ranging from strongest to
weakest, the continuum divides all verbal symbols into either fanciful, arbitrary, suggestion,
descriptive or generic words. See McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ i1:I-II:25 (detailing Abercrombie
continuum of mark distinctiveness). The continuum gives stronger rights to entirely made-up words.
Generic and common words receive little or no protection. The common rationale for these
distinctions is that made up words are more capable of distinguishing goods and services in commerce
and thus deserve more protection. See id. at § I I:i. But surely this cannot be the totality of it. It seems
equally if not more likely that common law judges developed these categorical distinctions in part
because of the Lockean-based notion that the more labor one puts into selecting and inventing a mark,
the greater one's property rights should be.
164. It is necessary that companies cull through the English language to pick suitable marks for
their businesses. The picking process inevitably involves a survey of common English words. It may
also involve some creative brainstorming in which companies consider a variety of made-up words.
Businesses need some flexibility in choosing a trademark. This flexibility may include picking a mark
that may be the same as or similar to an existing trademark of another company. There are only so
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compelling reason for sharing in the use of the Amazon name.
By contrast, we are not inclined to embrace a similar language

sharing rationale to justify the use of Google by a candy company. The
word "google" appears to most people to be highly unusual and basically
meaningless. In fact it was derived by the Google company, from the
obscure mathematical word "googol," which designates the number one
with a hundred zeros after it.' 65 In any event, the hypothetical candy
company clearly is not tapping into any preexisting and arguably shared

meaning of the word googol. As such, it has no language sharing interests
which even arguably could trump the property interests of Google, Inc.
It should be noted that there is a relationship between the first

limiting principle mentioned above (which focuses on the inventiveness
of the famous mark) and the second limiting principle (which focuses on

the language sharing interests of the alleged free-rider). The more
invented a word is, the less likely that depriving other trademark users
entirely of its use will result in any prejudice or harm to their language
sharing rights. If a word is completely made-up and none of its
constituent parts is comprised of an existing word or words, excluding
others from using it should not, in the usual case, result in cutting off
access to common words by other would-be trademark owners.
For example, preventing others from using Kodak as a trademark

for other types of products should not result in any harm to other
trademark users because Kodak is not descriptively related to the
function of cameras or any other type of product of which we are aware.
Other companies can select a trademark that does not come close to
Kodak without suffering any type of impairment to language sharing

interests.,66
many good or suitable words to go around. See Stephen Carter, The Trouble With Trademark,99 YALE
L.J. 759, 769-71 (99o) (explaining why language scarcity is more serious in trademark law than some
have supposed). Some words are simply better than others at describing and identifying a particular
line of products or services. See id. Flexibility is ensured through trademark law in a number of ways.
One way is to limit the basic level of trademark protection to the use of a similar mark on similar
goods in a way that confuses consumers as to source, sponsorship, or affiliation. Another way is by
requiring companies that pick common words as marks-such as the word "tasty"-to establish
secondary meaning (i.e., trademark significance to consumers) before trademark rights attach. See
McCARTHY, supra note 3, §§ I:15- i:i8. The necessity/flexibility principle should also limit the
operation of the anti-free-rider impulse in any new cause of action that is adopted. People have a
strong interest in using common elements of their native language. This interest continues to deserve
protection even when one wishes to use language as part of one's trademark and even when that
language resembles language that is already being used as a mark by someone else.
165. See Google Corporate Information, Google History, availableat www.google.com/corporatel
history.html (describing the story of how and why Google picked its trademark).
166. The foregoing discussion might be seen as an application of Lockean labor theory, in general,
and of the Lockean Proviso, in particular. In his classical work entitled Two TREATIES OF GOVERNMENT,
the sixteenth century English Philosopher John Locke posited that a person should be able to exclude
others from the fruits of her labor, so long as she left "enough and as good" for others. See JOHN
LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 27 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 1964) (1690). The
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By focusing on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and
the potential language sharing interests of the free-rider we should be
able to construct a more natural and compelling set of limits on an antifree-rider impulse than exist under current dilution law. With its myopic
concentration on concepts like blurring and tamishment, dilution law

largely misses these issues. The result has been a body of law that is
unnatural and incoherent, both in its underlying justification and in its
purported limiting devices.

D. THE IDENTICALITY ISSUE
Another possible way to limit the anti-free-rider impulse would be
to hold that free-riding on famous marks should only be actionable when
the defendant uses the exact same mark as the plaintiff's famous mark.
There is some support for this notion historically. For example, in his
seminal law review article, Frank Schechter limited his original dilution
proposal to cases where the defendant's mark was identical to the
famous mark for which protection was sought.' 6' More recently, the
United States Supreme Court held in the Victoria's Secret case that a
federal dilution claim requires proof of more than a mere mental
association between the famous and accused mark, but it limited this
holding to cases where the accused and famous mark are not identical.'6
It thus held open the door to the possibility that federal dilution can be
based on nothingmore than mere mental association when the marks are
in fact identical.' The upshot of this holding is that it is now much easier
to prove a dilution claim if the famous and accused marks are identical.'7"
At first blush, the identicality notion promises to serve as an
effective limiting device on an anti-free-riding cause of action. One
would think that courts should have little difficulty in determining
latter portion of this assertion-stating that exclusionary rights are limited by fairness principles-has
become known as the Lockean Proviso. The typical example of how the Proviso might apply in real
life situations involves reaping and sowing. If A farms open land (i.e., land she does not own) to the
point where it produces too stalks of corn, A is morally entitled to exclude others from reaping any of
that corn in the usual case. A's entitlement is based on her labor. She earned the right to reap the crop
by planting and tending to the seed. A's right is enforceable by law, unless A occupies so much of the
useable land in the area such that no one else can find their own land to farm. If A hogs land in this
manner, she no longer has a moral right to exclude others from her crop.
The Lockean Proviso provides a useful framework for analyzing the competing interests of trademark
owners. When a person invents a word, she adds something to the language that was not there before.
She ought to be entitled to exclude others from using that word unless to do so would mean that
others will not have sufficient access to the language to find or invent their own useful trademarks. In
assessing whether A's appropriation unduly limits access, one is right to consider whether A's madeup word is itself comprised of already existing words. If so, the potential costs for language sharing are
likely to be significant.
167. See Mosley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418 at 429 (20o3).
168. Id. at 433.
i6 See McCARTHY, supra note 3, § 101:2.
170. Victoria'sSecret, 537 U.S. at 433.
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whether an accused mark is identical to the famous mark for which
protection is sought. One would also think that limiting protection in this
manner would properly eliminate a whole host of cases from eligibility
for anti-free-riding protection. Indeed, limiting protection based on
identicality preserves the language sharing and expressive freedom
interests discussed above, because those interests are less strong when
one wishes to use a mark that is exactly the same as a famous mark. If
non-identical uses are exempt from liability, this might go a long way in
protecting legitimate interests grounded in expressive freedom and
language sharing.
On the other hand, the identicality limitation may prove problematic
by going too far in limiting protection. In many instances we intuitively
believe free-riding is wrong and unjustifiable even where the accused
mark is not identical to the famous mark. Take for example the famous
Google mark discussed above. If an on-line lending company called itself
go$ogle.com, we would be inclined to believe that this use should not be
allowed because the lending company is clearly free-riding on the fame
of the distinctive Google without any apparent justification. It does not
need to use the Google mark for any purpose. The meaning of the
underlying English word-googol-is not related to its lending business
in any manner we can determine. The mere fact that it has slightly
altered the Google mark-by inserting a dollar sign-does not seem to
be a compelling reason for either withholding anti-free-riding protection
(as Schechter would have done) or for imposing a materially higher
burden of proof on Google (as the Victoria'sSecret holding does).,""'

The intuitive feeling that free-riding is unjustifiable in the Google
hypothetical may lead courts to cheat. They may be inclined to modify
the identicality rule and hold that free-riding on a famous mark is
actionable so long as the accused mark is "substantially similar" to the
famous mark. 7 ' Or they may stretch the identicality requirement in other
ways to lessen its blow. For these reasons, identicality, per se, probably
would not be an effective limiting device.
The lesson to be derived from the identicality discussion is that the
finding of a lack of identicality between the famous and accused marks is
merely another shorthand way for a court to vindicate its true reason for
withholding protection: i.e., to allow protection might intrude too much
on the language sharing or expressive freedom interests of the person
who wishes to use a mark that is similar to, but not identical to, the
famous mark. It may yet be workable to have some kind of identicality
requirement to protect against free-riding, so long as it is applied in a
Id. at 433.
172. Given the ways that courts have stretched the dilution doctrine to vindicate their anti-freerider impulse, this type of judicial molding of an identicality rule does not seem far-fetched.
171.
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sensitive and flexible fashion. As stated above, there are likely to be
cases where persons should not be allowed to use non-identical marks
that are highly similar to, but not identical to, famous marks.

E.

REviSTrNG SOME DECIDED CASES

In this section, I revisit some already-decided dilution cases to see
how they can be analyzed differently under the approach described here.
i. The VICTORIA'S SECRET Case 73
There can be no doubt that the proprietor of Victor's Secret was
attempting to free-ride off the fame of the Victoria's Secret trademark.
Victor's Secret is very close to Victoria's Secret. It should have been very
easy for plaintiff to prove that consumers mentally associated Victor's
Secret with Victoria's Secret. I do not mean to imply that consumers
assumed there was any affiliation between the two entities. The district
court properly ruled that any such perception of affiliation was highly
unlikely. 74 Rather, consumers undoubtedly thought of the Victoria's
Secret trademark when encountering the Victor's Secret trademark. This
fact must have significantly influenced both the district court and the
Ninth Circuit to find in plaintiff's favor.
Even so, the Supreme Court was right to overrule the lower courts'
injunction. But the Supreme Court was right for the wrong reason. The
Court held that the FIDA requires actual dilution," which Victoria's
Secret did not adequately prove.' 6 However, the proper rationale for
deciding the case is that Victoria's Secret is not the kind of trademark
that should be eligible for expanded (anti-free-riding) trademark

protection at all. This is so because it is not a coined or quasi-coined
word or phrase. Victoria's Secret is not even an arbitrary use of common
words. Victoria's Secret probably was chosen by the women's lingerie
company to conjure up a connection with Queen Victoria, who ruled
during the "Victorian Age." It is a widely held belief that sexual mores

were repressive during that age.'" By referring to "Victoria's Secret," the
lingerie company may have intended to convey the impression that while
Queen Victoria was outwardly prim and proper, behind the scenes she
lived a voluptuous sexual life. The sales pitch is clear: you may be a prim
and proper American housewife, but you too can dress sexy in secret.
173. See earlier discussion of the facts of Victoria'sSecret, supraPart III.A.
174. See Victoria'sSecret, 537 U.S. at 425.
175. The Congressional intent to require actual dilution in the FTDA is unclear. In fact, the
legislative history appears to be silent this point. See generally HR. REP. No. 104-374 (1995).
176. Id at 433.
177. See MICHEL FOUcAULT, THE HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: AN INTRODUCTION 3-13 (Robert Hurley
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976). See also Robert Kahn, We Are Living In America's Victorian
Age, N. CoUNTY TzMEs, May 26, 2002, available at http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2oo02o5/26/
exportio6o5.txt. ("Victorianism today is generally interpreted to mean little more than an atmosphere
of sexual repression and hypocrisy...").
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It would not be proper as a matter of basic language sharing and
fairness to allow one company to have a monopoly on common language
that might be used to conjure up this sort of imagery. The defendant in
this case was, in essence, staking his claim to access to this common
language. His pitch was to men-to the "Victor's" of this world, who
might want to appear prim and proper in public, but who equally desired
a somewhat raunchy private sex life. Victoria's Secret assumed the risk of
such free-riding when it chose this sort of uncoined, common language as
a trademark. From a trademark point of view, it would have been better
off selecting a more unique word or phrase to invest in.
2.

The WAWA Case

The WaWa case is also worth revisiting. The reader may recall that
in the WaWa case, the plaintiff owned and operated a number of
convenience stores in the Philadelphia area under the trademark
"WaWa." I 8 Defendant started its own small store in the same general
geographic vicinity under the name "HaHa."'79 Defendant stated that the8 °
name "HaHa" was related in some sense to his family name "Haaf.
The district court was not persuaded of the relationship.'' The case
proceeded solely on a dilution theory. ' 8' The district court found for the
plaintiff and the Third Circuit affirmed.'8 3
At first blush, the holding seems sound from an anti-free-riding
perspective. Defendant clearly was free-riding off the fame of the
plaintiff's WaWa trademark. WaWa seems coined and meaningless. It
may sound a bit like a baby's word for water, but that is a stretch. Thus, it
ought to be entitled to fairly strong anti-free-riding protection. The
problem, however, is that defendant's mark does not duplicate or
incorporate plaintiff's mark. Rather, it is a significantly different
variation of it. It still conjures up plaintiff's mark, but it does so in a
slightly humorous manner. Ha ha means something in the English
language. Ha ha is a sound we make when we wish to verbally signify
laughter. Defendant wishes to use the phrase ha ha, not in a way that
describes the function of its goods, but in a way that plays off the double
meaning of the phrase in this context. It is at once a joke (ha ha) and an
allusion to the plaintiff's trade name.
This case is a close call, but on balance defendant's interests in
expressive freedom and language sharing seem to outweigh plaintiff's
interest in prevent free-riding on its mark. Plaintiff bears an extremely
178. For factual background on the WaWa case, see supra Part III.B.
179. Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629, 1631 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
i8o. Id at 1632.
181. Id at 1632-33.
182. Id at 163o-31.
183. Id at 1633; Wawa Inc. v. Haaf, II6 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997) (affirming the decision of the
district court).
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low risk of harm precisely because defendant's mark significantly varies
from plaintiff's mark. The district court undoubtedly sensed parasitic
intent and thought this enough to justify an injunction.' 4 It buttressed its
intuition with unpersuasive assertions about the likelihood of dilution.
Had it thought more carefully about the defendant's interests in using a
common word-ha ha-to describe it products, the court might have
sensed that there was'a need to control the anti-free-riding impulse in
this case.
To put matters differently, one might say that plaintiff has strong
ownership interests in WaWa, but not in HaHa. They are two different
words. HaHa free-rides on WaWa, but it does more. It is a common
English phrase. Wa wa is made-up. But it is close to common English
words or phrases that are not made-up-phrases like ha ha, ma ma, pa
pa, or ta ta. In choosing a word like WaWa as its trademark, plaintiff
assumed the risk that other parties might wish to appropriate any of
these similar words for their own convenience stores or other types of
businesses. The key question judges should ask in these sorts of cases is
this: by choosing an insufficiently unique mark, did plaintiff assume the
risk that others could come close merely by using common English
words? When the answer to that question is "yes," then anti-free-riding
protection should be denied. This is particularly true where, as here,
defendant's mark varies considerably from plaintiff's mark.' 85
3.

The POLAROID/POLARAID Case

A case we have not yet discussed, but which bears discussion in this
context, is Polaroid Corp. v. Polaraid,Inc.'86 There, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, applying the Illinois anti-dilution
statute, found that the defendant's use of "Polaraid" for the installation
of refrigeration and heating systems diluted the plaintiffs mark
"Polaroid" for cameras.8 7 The likelihood of harm here was remote.
People would not be less likely to buy Polaroid cameras because they
had seen advertisements for Polaraid cooling systems. The court
nevertheless issued an injunction here because defendant clearly was
free-riding on plaintiff's mark.' 8

184. See supra Part IIB, discussing district court decision.
i85. The United States Supreme Court was correct to note the importance of this factor in
Victoria's Secret. But it related it to the probability of dilution occurring. See Mosley v. V. Secret
Catalogue, 537 U.S. 418,427 (2oo3). There probably is some such relationship, but it does not properly
pinpoint the rationale for looking at the variance between the accused and the famous marks. The real
reason why the variance matters is because the defendant's language sharing and expressive freedom
interests are likely to be particularly strong in cases where the defendant's mark and plaintiff's mark
are not identical.
186. 319 F.2d 830 (7 th Cir. 1963).
187. Id. at 833-36.
188. Id. at 836.
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Under the proposal I advance here, the court would focus first on
the strength of the plaintiff's property interests in the Polaroid mark. The
word "Polaroid" appears to be a fairly strong trademark. It is a coined
word. However, even though it is an invented word, it is comprised of an
existing word with independent meaning in the English language. Polar,
as used in this context, probably alludes to the internal refraction of light
in a camera. A camera refracts light between two poles.' 89 Light goes
through a tiny hole at one pole of a camera and then branches out before
landing on the other pole. The addition of the "oid" component carries
less apparent meaning. Oid might be a reference to a type of advanced or
futuristic technology"9° Oid has been added to other made-up words and
it does not appear to be particularly unique. Thus, while Polaroid is an
invented word, it is not completely meaningless. It utilizes at least one
known word (polar) which carries significant meaning in the English
language and it relates that word to the function of the product at hand cameras.
On the other side of the equation are defendant's interests in using
Polaraid as a trademark. Polaraid is a complex word as used in the
context of this case. It seems highly important that defendant sells
heating and air conditioning equipment. Consumers are likely to
perceive the word "polar" as used here to be a reference to the North
Pole of the Earth. The North Pole is known to be cold. 9' Consumers are
likely to perceive the word "aid" as a modifier of the word polar. Aid
here might mean "reducer" or "increaser," depending on whether one is
seeking to purchase heating or cooling equipment. If one is seeking to
buy heating equipment, polar aid might mean relief from the cold. The
defendant's heating equipment reduces the polar air by supplying hot air.
Conversely, if one is seeking to buy air conditioning equipment, polar aid
might mean the addition of cold air into one's house. Either way,
Polaraid is a clever combination of two known English words.
In these circumstances, defendant has a strong claim to use the
words polar and aid. They are previously existing English words. He is
tapping directly and obviously into those English meanings in a way that
bears a logical and legitimate relationship to the products he offers for
sale. He may not be attempting to free-ride at all. Any appearance of
free-riding may be completely accidental.
But let us assume the contrary. Let us assume that defendant is
attempting to free-ride on the Polaroid mark, or at least that he is not
unaware of the fact that he is capitalizing to some extent on the fame of
that mark. I make this assumption because I think it is probably true.
189. See definition of "polar" availableat http://www.hyperdictionary.com.

i9o . See definition of "oid" availableat http://www.hyperdictionary.com.
191. See definition of "North Pole" available at http://www.hyperdictionary.com
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Moreover, even if the defendant did not intend to free-ride here, it is
likely that a considerable number of consumers would think of Polaroid
when they encountered the Polaraid mark.
Even so, the defendant's conduct probably would not be enjoined
under the proposal I advance here. Where, as here, the defendant's dual
use claim seems credible and related to the function of its products, the
law should withhold an injunction. In this situation, the defendant's
interests in tapping into common meanings of established words should
outweigh the plaintiff's interests in preventing free-riding. To give
plaintiff superior rights would unduly limit defendant's access to the
words "polar" and "aid," when both words describe its products. It is not
that defendant could not find another suitable trademark that in no way
alluded to the Polaroid mark. Rather, my point here is that it is not fair
to make the defendant do so. He should not have to steer clear of the
words "polar" and "aid" when those words relate so clearly to the
function of his products.
One might say, alternatively, that the plaintiff assumed the risk of
such free-riding when it chose to fashion its trademark from a common,
existing word-polar. It was unreasonable for plaintiff to assume that it
would be able to prevent everyone else from using that same word as a
component part of their own marks. To give legal backing to this
unreasonable assumption would be a violation of the Lockean Provisowhich requires property owners to leave "enough and as good" for
others. 92' Granting Polaroid injunctive relief in this case did not leave the
owner of Polaraid with "enough and as good" language to use in
fashioning its own mark."9
I provide these examples of how the free-rider concept might be
applied in concrete cases not to persuade the reader of a particular
result. Courts might come to different conclusions about how to answer
these questions. My point here is only to suggest that the discussion
about free-riding and its appropriate limits is more likely to yield positive
fruit if we focus on the degree of inventiveness of the famous mark and
the language sharing interest of the alleged free-rider than on the
blurring and tarnishment concepts of current dilution law.

See discussion of Lockean Proviso, supra notes 159, i66.
193. Another way to view the situation is that defendant should have a fair use defense analogous
192.

to copyright law. It has made a derivative work of a coined mark. Defendant added significant creative
components of its own and developed its own coined mark that is independently worthy of protection.
Defendant's use should not significantly cut into plaintiffs market in any way. On balance, this could
be seen as a type of fair use. For an analogous attempt to craft limits on the anti-free-riding impulse in
the right of publicity context, see Alice Haemmerli, Whose Who? The Case for a Kantian Right of
Publicity, 49 DuKE LJ. 383, 421 (1999).
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A NEW

CAUSE OF ACTION: THE EUROPEAN "UNFAIR
ADVANTAGE" CLAIM

In the preceding parts of this article, I have demonstrated that
current dilution law purports to be about preventing dilutive harm, but
really is about preventing free-riding on famous marks. I have also shown
that the anti-free-riding impulse can be explained and justified as an
integral part of an "as between" type of analysis. I have shown that this
analysis is a more natural and compelling way to account for dilution
cases than standard dilution theory. I have further shown that the antifree-riding impulse can be effectively limited by focusing on the degree
of inventiveness of the famous mark and on the alleged free-rider's
language sharing interests.
Still, I am aware that many readers may be reluctant to embrace an
independent cause of action that prevents free-riding without in some
way tying the cause of action to a theory of harm. I hope that some of
these fears can be allayed by the fact that we are not completely without
guidance or precedent in this effort. We would not be the first country to
adopt an anti-free-riding cause of action for famous trademarks that does
not depend on a harm-based concept like dilution. Many European
countries have a cause of action, explicitly denominated "unfair
advantage," which enables judges to punish free-riding without resort to
tortured reasoning about alleged dilutive harm.'9
The European "unfair advantage" cause of action is based on the
European Directive on the Harmonization of Trademark Law (the
"Directive").' 9 It is often included as an alternative basis of liability in
the same statutory provision that makes traditional dilution actionable.
Specifically, article 4(4)(a) of the Directive allows European Union
194. Council Directive 89/Io4JEEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade
o
marks, art. 4(4)(a), 1989 OJ. (L 4 ) i. Recently, for example, the First Board of Appeal of the
European Union's Office For Harmonization In The Internal Market (Trade Marks and Designs)
(OHIM) applied the unfair advantage cause of action to a dispute between an American
microprocessor manufacturer (Intel Corporation) and a European company that was using a stylized
variation of the INTEL mark in a different industry. See OHIM Decision of the First Board of Appeal,
Intel Corp. v. Intel-Internazionale Elettrotecnica Associazione, Case R782/2002-1, October 22, 2004
available at
(relating to Community Trademark application No. 854125, INTEL),
http://www.oami.eu.int.The defendant was in the business of organizing trade shows for various
companies, including electronic manufacturers. The lower tribunal had found no trademark
infringement under any theory on the ground that the defendant's goods were too dissimilar from the
plaintiff's to cause a likelihood of confusion or to constitute the taking of an "unfair advantage" on the
reputation of plaintiffs INTEL mark. The Board of Appeal disagreed and reversed, finding that the
trade show company was taking unfair advantage of the INTEL mark. The court noted that the
concept of unfair advantage is synonymous with free-riding on the investment of another firm in
advertising its own mark and it found such free riding here. See id. at para. 63-68. The Board of
Appeal also held that it was unnecessary to consider whether the defendant's use of the INTEL mark
harmed the plaintiff in any way given the clear existence of unjustfied free riding. See id
195. Council Directive 89/io4/EEC to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trade
marks, art. 4(4)(a), 1989 O.J. (L 40) I
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Member States to refuse registration to trademarks that would take
unfair advantage of the reputation of a mark that has already been
registered or is to be registered within their territory:
Any member State may 0 provide that a trade mark shall not be
registered or, if registered, shall be liable to be declared invalid where,
and to the extent that: [] the trade mark that is identical with, or similar
to, an earlier national trade mark... and is to be, or has been,
registered for goods or services which are'not similar to those for which
the earlier trade mark is registered, where the earlier trade mark has a
reputation in the Member State concerned and where the use of the
later trade mark without due cause would take unfair advantage of, or
be detrimental to, the distinctive character or the repute of the earlier

trade mark.196
Similarly, article 5(2) of the Directive states that Member States may
entitle trademark owners to enjoin the use of marks that would take
unfair advantage of the repute of their marks:
Any Member State may also provide that the proprietor shall be
entitled to prevent all third parties not having his consent from using in
the course of trade any sign which is identical with, or similar to, the
trade mark in relation to goods or services which are not similar to
those for which the trade mark is registered, where the [trade mark] has
a reputation in the Member State concerned and where use of that sign
without due cause takes unfair advantage of, or is detrimental to, the
distinctive characteror the repute of the trade mark.'97

A number of European countries have enacted unfair advantage
statutes which essentially track the EU Directives. Italian law is
illustrative. 9 For example, article i.i(c) of the Italian Trademark Act'"
provides that:
The owner [of a registered mark] has the right to prevent third parties,
not having his authorization, from using..., a sign identical with or
similar to a mark registered for dissimilar goods or services, if the
registeredmark enjoys a reputation in the Country and if use of the sign
without due cause permits taking unfair advantage of the distinctive
character of the reputation of the mark or causing detriment to the
same.

The Italian Trademark law also provides that marks that take unfair
advantage of earlier marks shall not be registered on the Italian

196. Id. (emphasis added).
i97. Id. at art. 5(2) (emphasis added).
198. I discuss Italian law only as an example of -how one European country has developed
statutory and decisional law pursuant to the European Directive. It is not intended to be exhaustive or
necessarily representative of how any other European country has implemented the same Directive.
199. See Italian Trademark Act, Royal Decree No. 929 of June 21, I942, amended by Legislative
Decree No. 480 of Dec. 4, 1992 and by Legislative Decree No. 198 of Mar. 19 i996 (emphasis added)
[hereinafter Italian Trademark Act].
200. See id.
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trademark registry."°
The Italian Trademark Act thus provides expanded trademark
protection under the following circumstances. First, only registered
marks that "enjoy a reputation" in the Country (Italy) qualify for this
type of protection." The category of eligible marks appears to be
broader than the category of famous marks that enjoy anti-dilution
protection in the United States. It appears that any mark that is
sufficiently well known to be subject to free-riding is sufficiently well
known to be eligible for the expansive protections set forth in articles
I.i(c) and I7.I(g).' This is not to say that any and all trademarks qualify
for this expanded form of protection. To the contrary, it appears that this
protection is available only for marks that, due to their reputation, carry
and communicate a symbolic message in a way that consumers will
associate those marks with a junior similar mark used in connection with
dissimilar products.'
Second, there is conflicting law as to whether the unfair advantage
cause of action applies only to dissimilar goods cases, or whether it might
also be applied in cases where the plaintiff and the defendant are
competitors (and thus sell similar types of goods).' The better view
seems to be that the unfair advantage cause of action should apply only
to dissimilar goods.
Third, the essence of the cause of action is the prevention of the6
taking of "unfair advantage" of the reputation of the well-known mark.
Uses of signs that take unfair advantage of a well-known mark are
contrasted in the Italian statute with uses that are detrimental to the
distinctive character of a well-known mark.7 The latter concept is akin
to the dilution cause of action in the United States. Taking unfair
advantage of a mark is clearly a distinct type of wrong that is actionable
under the Italian statute. The concept of unfair advantage is meant to
2o.

See Italian Trademark Act art. 17.1(g).

Id. arts. r.r(c),

17.1(g).
203. See Case 375/97, General Motors v. Yplon, 1999 E.C.R 1-5421, 3 C.M.LR 427,
202.

28 (1999),
where the European Court of Justice, interpreting EU Directive 5(2) (upon which article i.I[c] of the
Italian Trademark Act is based), held that to qualify for the expanded protection under 5(2) a mark
does not have to be prominent or even renown; instead, it must be known by a significant part of the
public in the Member State concerned. This appears to be a broad standard favoring wide application
of the unfair advantage cause of action.
204. See id
205. Compare Davidoff & Cie SA v. Gofkid Ltd, [2003] All ER (EC) 1029,
30 , Case 292/oo
(20o3) (unfair competition can protect against later user with similar or identical goods or services),
with La Chemise Lacoste v. Crocodile Garments, Trib. di Milano, 12 July 1999, 1999 Giurisprudenza
Annotata Di Dirito Industriale [Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus.], No. 4017, 1251 (holding Italy's version of
unfair advantage directive does not apply when goods are in identical mercantile sector).
206. See Nike Italy s.r.l. & Nike (Ireland) Ltd v. Saledo Italia s.r.l. & Campomar s.r.l. & Nike
Cosmetics S.A., Trib. di Milano, 23 Dec. 1999, 2000 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 4116, 578.
207. Italian Trademark Act art. 17. 1 (g).
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cover all instances where there is an attempt to take advantage-without
due cause-on the reputation of the famous mark by exploiting and
capitalizing on its attractive value and commercial magnetism.1
Fourth, Italian courts in general appear to have limited the unfair
advantage concept'' to cases where the defendant acted with demonstrable
"parasitic intent." In the reported cases, it would appear that only
intentional and knowing free-riding has been enjoined under the unfair
advantage prong of the Italian statute.
Several courts have had occasion to apply the unfair advantage
prong of the Italian statute. In all of these cases courts enjoined freeriding on famous marks without requiring proof of dilution. For example,
in one case, the Court of Milan held that the defendant's use of the sign
(i.e.: trademark) Nike Sports Fragrance, as used in connection with
perfumes and cosmetic products, took unfair advantage of the reputation
of the famous mark Nike, on the ground that the adoption of such a
similar sign was based on the clear intent of the defendant to benefit
from the celebrity and attractive value of the mark belonging to the
worldwide leader in sporting garments."' The court did not require the
plaintiff to prove a likelihood of confusion or dilution, but rather based
its decision on the demonstrable free-riding intent of the defendant."'
Similarly, in another case decided by the Court of Milan, it held that
plaintiff's famous mark AGIP, as used in connection with gasoline in
Italy, was infringed by the defendant's use of the mark Acid (with a logo
that was similar to the AGIP logo)." ' The court was heavily influenced
by the evidence of defendant's intent to capitalize on the reputation of
the mark AGIP when they started marketing t-shirts under a similar
mark. 3
Finally, another Italian court held that the famous mark Pirelli, as
used in connection with tires, was infringed when a company attempted
to use the same mark on perfumes. 4 Again, the court was concerned not
with confusion as to source or dilution as such, but rather with
preventing an obvious attempt at unauthorized free-riding. 5 The
parasitic intent of the defendant provided an independent basis for
enjoining its activity, despite the lack of proof of any type of commercial

208. See Nike, 2000 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 416, at 585.
209. See, e.g., id.
210. See id. at 585.
211. Id.
212. AGIP Petroli s.p.a.
v. Dig. It. Int'l s.r.1. & Ambrosiana Serigrafica s.r.l.,
Trib. di MIlano, 4
Mar. i999, 1999 Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 3987,977.
213. Id. at 981.
214. Pirelli s.p.a.
v. SA.FO.SA s.r.l., Trib. di Monza, 8 July i999, Giur. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 4o16,
1226.

215. Id. at 1255.
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6
harm to the plaintiff.2Y
These cases illustrate that it is possible to punish free-riding without
resort to traditional principles of dilution. They also illustrate that it is
possible to provide this extended form of trademark protection without
wreaking undue havoc in the law. The Italian cause of action captures
the essence of the anti-free-riding impulse and places it under the banner
of "unfair advantage." But it also attempts to limit that impulse by
including in the statute language that immunizes free-riding that is
justified by "due cause.. ' ..7
It appears that Italian courts have not yet formulated a systematic
doctrine for what will and what will not qualify as due cause for freeriding on a famous trademark. However, at least one Italian decision
may provide the seeds of a more developed theory. In the case of
Leonardo Bugatti & Soci s.r.l. v. Ducati Motorcycles, the Italian court of
Bologna refused the request of the famous Italian motorcycle maker,
Ducati, to enjoin a beer maker from selling beer under a similar name.""
The beer maker originally sold its beer under the label, Birra Ducati,
which it later changed under pressure from the motorcycle company to
Birra Ducati ItalianiY9 The Court rejected the motorcycle company's
contention that the use of the same mark in connection with selling beer
took unfair advantage of, or was detrimental to, the reputation of
2 The decision was formally premised on the ground
defendant's mark."
that the products in question (motorcycles and beer) were so unrelated
that any mental association in consumers' minds was unlikely.'
However, the consumer association rationale seems suspect. The
marks were nearly identical. Ducati had long been a famous mark for
motorcycles in Italy. There can be little doubt consumers would think of
motorcycles when seeing the beer. And it seems clear that defendant
desired, to some extent, to take a free-ride on fame that had been created
by the plaintiff. It seems more likely that the court's unwillingness to
enjoin the defendant from continued use of the Ducati mark had to do
with the fact that ducati is not a coined or even quasi-coined word in
Italian. It means "dukes" and is generally understood as a reference to
that period in Italian feudal history when various dukes ruled the land.2
In these circumstances, the court's ruling would have been decided the

216. Id. at 1246.
217. See Italian Trademark Act art. i.i(c), stating that the accused use must be "without due
cause" to qualify for protection under the unfair advantage prong of the statute.
218. Leonardo Bugatti & Soci s.r.l. v. Ducati Motorcycles s.p.a, Trib. di Bologna, 17 Feb. 1997,
Guir. Ann. Dir. Indus., No. 3746, 216.
2i9 . See id. at 220-22.
220. Id.
221.

IlL

222. Id.
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exact same way under the rules I propose here.
Because the Italian word "ducati" is not coined and not particularly
distinctive (in Italian), it can be said that the motorcycle company, in
selecting such a mark to make famous and invest with secondary
meaning, assumed the risk that other businesses in unrelated fields would
be entitled to take a free-ride on its investment. Given the overwhelming
fame in Italy of Ducati motorcycles, it is difficult to believe that the
defendant was not attempting to free-ride on that fame. But the freeriding was considered justifiable here because of the defendant's
legitimate right to tap into the primary meaning of the Italian word for
"dukes" as part of its own trademark.
As the Ducati case illustrates, it ought to be possible to develop
limits on an anti-free-riding cause of action that are based on
considerations of language sharing and expressive freedom. The problem
with the European model, however, is that it does not appear to be
formally limited in any particular way. Rather, judges are given this
vague statutory phrase-unfair advantage-and told only to limit it
based on findings of due cause. One can find some attempts in the
decided cases to impose such limits, 3 but, again, these attempts have
been far from systematic.
Any adoption of the European model into American law would,
therefore, require modification to include limitations, which would
ensure appropriate protections for justifiable free-riding. Above I argued
that such limitations might be grounded in theories about language
sharing and expressive freedom." In order to safeguard these interests, a
person should not be enjoined from using a mark that is the same or
similar to a famous mark whenever the person (i) is not free-riding on
that mark, but rather is tapping into the same underlying meanings that
the famous mark happens to tap into; or (2) is partially free-riding on the
mark, but this free-riding is justifiable given the person's interest in
access to various parts of the English language.
These language sharing concerns could be dealt with in a variety of
ways: judges might wish to balance the respective property rights of the
parties; they might wish to fashion bright line rules; or they may wish to
adopt some mixture of these two approaches. Here, I argue that the
latter approach is preferable. Expansive anti-free-riding protection
should be categorically limited to coined and quasi-coined famous marks,
and even with respect to such marks an injunction should be withheld
whenever the defendant is tapping into meanings that exist in the English
language separate and distinct from the fame of plaintiff's mark.
By coined, I mean completely made-up words-i.e., words that
223.
224.

See id. The Ducati case can be viewed as such an attempt.
See supra Part V.
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simply did not exist before they were invented by the trademark owner.
Kodak is an example; Xerox is another. Under the proposal I advance
here, anti-free-riding protection might also extend to quasi-coined words,
by which I mean words that are partially comprised of invented
components. Polaroid is such a word. It did not exist before the camera
company invented it, but it is not wholly made-up either. It includes the
known word polar. Nevertheless, it is sufficiently distinct and creative to
include it in the category of marks that are eligible for expansive
trademark protection.
I would also include in the quasi-coined category words that are
creatively derived (partially made-up) from obscure words. Google is an
example of this type of word. It was derived from the existing and
obscure word googol (which signifies the number one with a hundred
zeros). Although Google is pronounced the same as the known English
word on which it is based (googol) and is only spelled slightly differently,
it appears to be sufficiently obscure and unknown to the vast majority of
Americans that it is the functional equivalent of a coined word.
The point here is not to suggest that Google would always win in an
anti-free-riding lawsuit. To the contrary, there may be cases where
another party is justified in free-riding on Google's name. This could
occur, for example, if a math book company named itself Googol-in an
attempt to tap into the connection between the huge number (googol)
and the purpose of studying math (number mastery). Rather, the point
here is to show that there is no compelling reason why the famous mark
Google should be ineligible per se for expansive anti-free-riding
protection.
Limiting anti-free-riding protection to coined and quasi-coined
marks would be a quick and fairly easy way to ensure that the new cause
of action does not interfere with other parties' legitimate reasons for
free-riding. Indeed, one rarely has a good reason for free-riding on a
mark that has been entirely made-up by someone else. Moreover,
protection should not be automatic even for these types of marks. As I
demonstrated above, judges should ask in every case whether an
injunction would unduly limit the defendant's interests in language
sharing and expressive freedom.225
VII. INTELLECTUAL HISTORY-REVISITING SCHECHTER
In Part I of this article I mentioned that the dilution concept as
exhibited in American trademark law has often been traced to a 1927 law
review article by Frank Schechter, a New York attorney. 6 Schechter's
original proposal applied only to coined, fanciful, or arbitrary marks;
225. Id.
226.

See supraPart I, discussing Schechter, supra note 14.
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only to situations in which the junior user's mark was identical to that of
the senior user; and only to use of identical marks on non-competing
goods.227 Schechter was not primarily concerned with preventing dilutive
harm; rather, he was primarily concerned with protecting the property
interests that arise in famous mark due to their unique function as
creating and reinforcing commercial custom (i.e., cementing the link
between consumer and mark owner).2"
To be sure, Schechter argued that marks can be harmed in ways that
go beyond the traditional likelihood of confusion type of harm (i.e., the
diversion of customers from mark owner to mark impersonator). 29 And
Schechter discussed the notion of the diminishment of a mark's selling
power as a type of harm that falls outside the traditional likelihood of
confusion paradigm. 3 But Schechter's discussion of harm was, in my
view, largely an add-on. It was a way to supplement an already strong
property theory with something more. It was, in lawyer's language, an
"even if" type of argument. Schechter was essentially saying that even if
the pure property view is not enough to justify broad rights in
trademarks, then those rights are further justified given the possibility
that such marks might be harmed in a variety of ways if others are
permitted to use them widely.
The harm component was thus not essential to Schechter's theory.
But Schechter did not do a good enough job in articulating why freeriding on famous marks is wrong in one situation and acceptable in
another. The harm prong of his theory thus served a purpose in the
development of the dilution concept in American law: it furnished a
potential (and alluring) boundary device for this expansive cause of
action. That is, as the law developed in this area, legislators, courts, and
commentators all attached to the dilution concept as a way of articulating
and hopefully cabining the new cause of action. The result, eventually, is
dilution law as we have come to know it.
The problem with these developments is that harm has served as an
illusory boundary. The concept of dilutive harm has not been easy to pin
down. As I demonstrated above, we can never be very sure whether a
mark is famous enough to qualify for dilution protection, but we are even
less sure whether the mark has been harmed to a sufficient degree or in
the specified way to warrant anti-dilution protection. The harm boundary
has thus not fulfilled its promise. 3' It has not functioned as a useful
limiting device.

227.
228.
229L
230.
231.

See Schechter, supra note 14.
Id. at 8M8-I9, 830-33.
See id. at 825.
Id. at 814-19.
See supra Part I.
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More fundamentally, it is wrong to focus too much on harm in these
cases. The most compelling rationale for offering an expanded form of
property protection to famous trademarks lies in a multi-faceted
balancing approach that focuses mostly on the comparative interests of
the famous mark owner in protecting her investment (an interest that is
limited by the type of mark she chose to make famous) and the relative
interests of the would-be mark user in tapping into the underlying
language that the famous mark employs. Considerations of harm,
including dilutive harm, may figure in the analysis. But they are best seen
as subsidiary to the issue of whether the mark owner has a sufficiently
superior interest to be given control over a particular piece of language.
It is also not particularly helpful to elevate harm-based concerns to a
central place in trademark law. To do so is to miss the point of why antifree-riding protection ought to be available for a certain class of famous
trademarks. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court's recent decision
in the Victoria's Secret case, in which the Court heightened the harm
requirement and mandated that plaintiffs show that actual dilutive harm
has already begun to occur, is misguided. 3 The malleability of the
likelihood of dilution standard has enabled judges to punish free-riding
in some situations where it should be punished. It is wrong to require
actual harm when the essence of the cause of action is the prevention of
free-riding. In short, the Court has exacerbated the wrong turn that was
taken long ago in dilution law when it came to focus so fully on harm as a
limiting device.
The proposal advanced here seeks to return to the more propertycentered view offered by Frank Schechter in 1927. Harm would not play
a primary role in the scheme put forward here. Rather, famous coined
and quasi-coined marks would receive a broad form of property
protection regardless of whether the use of the same mark by another
entity would be likely to injure the mark owner-in the sense of causing
a diminishment of the selling power of the mark or in the sense of
tarnishing the image of the mark owner.
However, the proposal advanced here is also significantly different
than the one offered by Schechter. First, Schechter did not fully analyze
why free-riding on coined marks is unacceptable but free-riding on other
types of marks might be acceptable. Nor did he focus on the theoretical
underpinnings of the anti-free-riding concept-its ultimate grounding in
the "as between" type of argument and its reliance on harm only as a
peripheral justification. Finally, he did not explore the countervailing
interests in allowing people to use famous marks-particularly the
interests in language sharing and expressive freedom. 33
See Moseley v. V. Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 48,425
233. See supra Part V.
232-

(2003).
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Another area in which the proposal advanced here differs from the
original Schechter proposal concerns whether anti-free-rider protection
should be available to prevent the use of marks that are only similar to,
but not identical to, the famous mark for which protection is sought.
Schechter, without much explanation, limited his original proposal to
identical marks.' That is, he would have offered expanded trademark
protection only as a device for enjoining the use of a mark that was
identical to the famous mark for which protection is sought. 3 I think
Schechter was wrong in this respect. As I show above, there are
compelling cases involving non-identical marks where anti-free-riding
protection should be available.3 6 And that protection should not
necessarily entail more difficult proof requirements than situations
involving identical marks. 37
CONCLUSION

I have argued in this Article that American dilution law focuses too

much on harm and not enough on the anti-free-riding impulse and its
limits. Harm is always possible when free-riding occurs, but it should not

be the focus of an anti-free-riding law suit. This is so because ultimately
the issue in such suits is whether the property interests of the plaintiff
outweigh the language sharing and expressive freedom interests of the
defendant. Focusing too much on harm distracts courts from this ultimate
issue. In some cases, a focus on harm may function as a proxy for such
concerns, but even if this is true, it is a clumsy and distracting doctrinal
tool. By focusing on harm to the exclusion of these other interests courts
are likely to offer too little protection in some cases and too much
protection in others.

The United States Supreme Court has made matters worse by ruling
that dilution requires proof of actual harm."

Actual harm rarely is

present in these cases; nor should it be required to justify injunctive
relief. The question of how imminent harm must be before relief can be
granted is a wrong turn in this area of the law. The focus should instead
be on the type of mark chosen by the plaintiff; specifically whether it is

234. See Schechter, supra note 14, at 825.
235. This limitation has been echoed recently by the United States Supreme Court in its recent
Victoria's Secret opinion. There the Court ruled that judges are no longer free to presume dilution
from the mere fact that consumers mentally associate the defendant's mark with the plaintiff's famous
mark. See Victoria's Secret, 537 U.S. at 433-34. But the Court limited this holding to cases such as the
one before it-where the defendant's mark was not identical to the plaintiffs famous mark. Id. The
Court did not limit dilution per se to identical marks situations, but it made dilution much harder to
prove in situations where a defendant's mark is not identical to a plaintiffs mark. See McCARTm',
supra note 3, § 1Ot:2.
236. See supraPart V.
237. See supra Part V(D).
238. See supraPart I, discussing the recent Victoria'sSecret case.
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coined and distinctive, or whether it is merely an amalgamation of
common words. The more distinctive the plaintiff's mark, the stronger
the protection should be. Indeed, the proposal advanced here would
provide expanded trademark protection only to coined or quasi-coined
words.
Equally important in these cases are defendants' interests in
language sharing and expressive freedom. These interests receive the
bulk of their protection by limiting expanded trademark rights to coined
or quasi-coined marks. However, even coined marks should not receive
unlimited protection. There are legitimate reasons for using marks that
are similar to coined marks. Proper judicial sensitivity to these reasons is
more likely to occur if they are openly debated.
Dilution law, as originally conceived and proposed, was more akin to
the proposal I make here than to dilution law as it is currently configured
in the United States. In his seminal law review article on the subject,
Frank Schechter urged a broad type of property right for certain types of
trademarks. His examples all involved coined marks which were copied
without justification. He argued that the expanded right was grounded in
a property type rationale, not primarily in a tort rationale. Dilution law's
departure from this paradigm has come at a high cost. American dilution
law is incoherent and masks the underlying interests which are at stake in
these cases. The proposal advanced here is an attempt to refocus dilution
law on its proper aim-the protection of invented language against
unjustified free-riding.
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